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Abstract
Many philosophers aim to develop a theory of reality—to answer the question, what
does reality consist in? Roughly, this is the challenge of ontology. For the last
half-century, perhaps most philosophers in the analytic tradition have approached this
so-called ontological question arguing that it should be understood as a question about
what there is. Call this the Neo-Quinean approach. In recent years, however, serious
competitors to this approach have emerged. Neo-Aristotelians, for example, take the
ontological question to be best understood as a question about what is fundamental.
The Neo-Sellarsians take it to be about the relations between what they call the
manifest and scientific images. And the Neo-Carnapian approach is aimed at showing
the triviality or meaninglessness of ontology. Since the disagreement at hand is about
how we ought to understand the very challenge of ontology, the debate is, as it were, a
“meta-ontological” one. In this project, I defend the claim that Neo-Meinongianism
deserves a seat at the table. To this end, I take up two general tasks. First, I motivate
the kind of Neo-Meinongianism I am interested in (§1). Second, I further demonstrate
its utility by exploring its connection to truth (§2), mereology (§3), and time (§4).
In §1, I consider the merits of jointly endorsing Meinongianism and Ontological
Pluralism. With the aim of showing that the two views complement one another, I

argue that such a meta-ontology can have tremendous utility, since it inherits the
resources of both its constituent meta-ontologies, but avoids some objections that
plague each constituent meta-ontology held independently.
In §2, I explore the connection between a sort of Meinongianism and Truth. Some
find it deeply intuitive that a true proposition is true in virtue of some relation that
obtains between the proposition and reality. Some find it deeply intuitive that there are
straightforwardly true propositions about nonexistent entities. A puzzle therein arises
for those who have both intuitions. In this chapter, I develop this puzzle and explore
the prospects of responding to it by appeal to the seemingly unprincipled response that
some truths depend on being, and others do not. Ultimately, I argue that Meinongians
have the machinery to offer a satisfying solution to the puzzle by way of a specific
version of alethic pluralism. I conclude by preemptively responding to a number of
objections.
In §3, I explore the connection between ontological pluralism and mereological
pluralism. I argue that ontological pluralism is well-positioned to motivate
mereological pluralism and that mereological pluralism carries tremendous theoretical
utility. The two views therein make an attractive package. Insofar as the ontological
pluralist decides to embrace mereological pluralism, she will inherit the resources to
resolve some perennial metaphysical puzzles. I conclude, among other things, that the
ontological pluralist has strong reason to be a mereological pluralist, and that everyone
has strong reason to take ontological pluralism even more seriously.
In §4, I develop and defend a theory of time I call Meinongian Growing Block

Theory, which deploys the metaontological resources of both Meinongianism and
Ontological Pluralism. Initially, I articulate the view by juxtaposing it against two
neighboring views, Meinongian Presentism and Presentist Existential Pluralism. I
argue that Meinongian Growing Block Theory is preferable to these views and suggest
reasons for thinking it will also fair well against new competitors from the Moving
Spotlight and Fragmentalism camps as well.
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Tignor, Jan Swiderski, Çağla Çimendereli, Rose Bell, Joseph Martinez, Jaime
Castillo-Gamboa, David Clark, Zachary Goodsell, Laura Gurskey, Philip Li, Weng Kin
San, Steve Woodworth, David Limbaugh, Nicole Garcia, Nate Lauffer, Andrew Del Rio,
Wesley Chambers, Danny Simpson, Mark Boespflug, and Nolan Whitaker for creating
such welcoming, philosophically vibrant communities in both New York and California.
Finally, to my beloved wife and best friend, Aubree. The sacrifices you have made
for my sake render me speechless. Thank you for your unwavering support, without
which this project never would have begun, let alone been completed.

vii

Contents
Abstract
Acknowledgments

vi

Preface

x

I

A M ETA -O NTOLOGY

1 Meinongian Ontological Pluralism
1.1 The View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.2 The Counting Argument . . . . . . . . .
1.3 The Problem of Mixed Ontological Status
1.4 The Characterization Problem . . . . . .
1.5 The Upshot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.
.
.
.
.

2
3
9
14
21
25

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

27
27
28
31
31
32
33
35

3 From MOP to Mereological Pluralism
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

39
39

II

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

S OME A PPLICATIONS

2 Meinongian Alethic Pluralism
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.2 Motivating the Puzzle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.3 Meinongian Alethic Pluralism . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.3.1 Meinongianism and the Dual Copula Strategy
2.3.2 From DCS to Alethic Pluralism . . . . . . . . .
2.3.3 Alethic Pluralism at Work . . . . . . . . . . .
2.4 Objections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

viii

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

3.2 The Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2.1 Ontological Pluralism . . . . .
3.2.2 Mereological Pluralism . . . .
3.3 Fittingness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.3.1 Methodological Kin . . . . . .
3.3.2 Metaontological Amenability .
3.3.3 Potential Costs . . . . . . . .
3.4 Extensionality . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.5 Pluralism at Work . . . . . . . . . . .

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

4 MOP and the Growing Block
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.2 Pluralist Presentism vs. Meinongian Presentism
4.3 Meinongian Growing Block Theory . . . . . . .
4.3.1 A Meta-Ontology . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3.2 An Analogy Between Modality and Time
4.3.3 A-Theoretic Commitments . . . . . . . .
4.3.4 The Scoreboard at Half-Time . . . . . . .
4.4 Moving Spotlight Theory and Fragmentalism . .
4.4.1 Cameron’s Moving Spotlight Theory . . .
4.4.2 Skow’s Quasi-Fragmentalism . . . . . . .

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

40
40
42
44
44
46
48
50
53

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

56
56
57
60
60
61
63
66
70
71
74

References

77

Vita

86

ix

Preface
Before moving forward, I should be explicit about some of my methodological
convictions. I do not plan to say more in defense of these convictions beyond the little I
am about to say; some of these are more controversial than others. First, I take myself
to be engaged in the programme of revisionary metaphysics. Contra-Strawson, I do not
think metaphysics is merely descriptive; rather, it will often recommend revisions to
how we think. I submit reality has scheme-independent joints, and metaphysicians are
to aim at capturing them.
Second, I am something of a phenomenal conservative. Thus, while I endorse a
kind of revisionary approach to metaphysics, the more a theory violates our intuitions
the more it is rendered implausible, all else being equal. Of course, if some deeply
counter-intuitive theory has far more utility than its competitors, the cost may yet be
worth paying, at least provisionally. Intuitions help establish our default position.
Third, and relatedly, I think similarly of the role of language in metaphysics—that
we should be semantically conservative. I take language to be representational, such
that illuminating its structure can give us insight into the structure of reality; doing
semantics is metaphysically illuminating. As an example, I think language gives us
x

good reason to have as our default view that there are individuals and properties, and
that there is a categorical difference between them. Of course, just because
conservatism recommends this as the default view does not mean we will never
endorse revisionary views; the price just has to be right. I suspect in many cases it will
be.
Fourth, I do not have much faith in ontological simplicity. By this I mean that I
cannot see any good reason why one should arrive at the ontological enterprise
expecting to find that reality should be simple—that there should be few joints.
Perhaps such an expectation is supposed to be motivated by a prior commitment to
metaphysical naturalism. I don’t much like naturalism either. To be clear, I do not take
this to bear on the theoretical virtue of simplicity. Indeed, should two theories be equal
with respect to their utility, we ought to prefer the simpler one. But, importantly,
unless there is a tie in theoretical utility, I say there is no “razor” to be had.

xi

Part I
A Meta-Ontology

1

1

Meinongian Ontological Pluralism

Few philosophers defend Meinongianism, the view that there are things that do not
exist. Even fewer argue for Ontological Pluralism, the view that there are different
ways to exist. In this paper, I argue that the two aforementioned views complement
one another. Call the combination of the two views, Meinongian Ontological Pluralism,
or MOP. My project here is twofold: first, to show that MOP inherits the resources of
both its constituent meta-ontologies, and second, to show that endorsing both
Meinongianism and Ontological Pluralism together affords one with the resources to
resolve objections that plague each view held independently.
In the first part of the paper, I gesture at some of the work Meinongians and
Ontological Pluralists have claimed their respective meta-ontologies will do for them
and note that the two views are compatible such that the combined view inherits the
resources of the two theories.
As a preface, Meinongians reject the Quinean link between the existence and
quantification, since ex hypothesi there are many entities in the domain of
quantification that do not exist (e.g. fictional entities). For the Meinongian, the truth
of sentences of the following form are commonplace: There is some x such that x does
2

not exist. Importantly, the view straightforwardly allows one to make truthful
predications of nonexistent entities. Apart from Meinongianism, we might be puzzled
about how to account for putative truths such as ‘Pegasus can fly’, especially in light of
Pegasus’s failure to exist.
Ontological Pluralism also offers tremendous utility. The pluralist denies that
existence is univocal.1 The theory is often said to capture the intuitive view that what
we mean when we say that tables exist is something other than what we mean when
we say numbers exist. Indeed, ex hypothesi, there is more than one way to exist. The
appeal to ways of being allows one to resolve various metaphysical puzzles; where the
pluralist might otherwise be forced to admit the non-existence of some entity (e.g. past
objects), she can claim that the entity rather exists in a different way.
One worry, however, is that in addition to inheriting the resources of
Meinongianism and Ontological Pluralism, it also inherits the objections that plague
either view. On this front, I address the Counting Argument against Ontological
Pluralism (§1.2), the problem of mixed ontological status for Ontological Pluralism
(§1.3), and the characterization problem for Meinongianism (§1.4).

1.1

T HE V IEW

Here, I formulate what I call Meinongian Ontological Pluralism. We can start with a
slogan version of the view: there are entities that do not exist; of the entities that exist,
1

There are formulations of ontological pluralism that emphasize the metaphysical rather than the
linguistic (e.g. McDaniel (2017)), but in this chapter I focus on versions that either have linguistic
components, or partly rely on linguistic motivations.

3

not all exist in the same way.2 In the introduction, I hastily called the view that there
are things that do not exist, Meinongianism. But Meinongianism, the sort I endorse
here, has another important component; it takes existence to be a property—a
first-order one. Importantly, Meinongians reject the idea that existence should be
understood as a property of properties, or that it can be adequately accounted for with
the quantifier of first-order logic. The view, then, can be characterized as follows:3
(1) Existence is a first-order property.
(2) There are entities that lack this property.
What follows by the lights of the Meinongian is that we cannot infer from the claim
that because some x does not exist, that there is no such x; nor can we deduce from the
claim that because there is some x, that some x exists. Alas, the Meinongian quantifier
ranges over more than all the existents.
Here’s a natural worry. It may appear as though the MOPist cannot commit to (1)
and (2) as they are since she endorses Ontological Pluralism, the view that there are
different ways to exist. This natural worry arises because recent proponents of
Ontological Pluralism have formulated the doctrine by invoking a plurality of
semantically primitive, restricted quantifiers.4 This way of understanding the doctrine,
2

Given this characterization, Meinong’s own view might be said to qualify as a kind of MOP, at least if
we understand his notion of being to be tantamount to my notion of existence. However, as will become
clear, I make no distinction between existence and being; Meinongian subsistence will therein fail to fit
into the MOPist framework.
3
Plausibly, there are more precise ways to formulate the view, such as in Sainsbury (2010), which
distinguishes between the view’s ontological, linguistic, and formal commitments. I take it nothing substantive is lost here by giving this simple, albeit coarse characterization.
4
See McDaniel (2009, 2010, 2017) and Turner (2010). I go on to sometimes refer to this way of
formulating Pluralism as the “traditional” way. This formulation of pluralism is what Simmons (2020)
refers to as Quantificational Pluralism.

4

however, does not fit well with the aforementioned characterization of Meinongianism
for a few reasons. First, one reason to prefer the primitive quantifier formulation of
Pluralism is that it can be exposited from within a Quinean framework with relatively
few revisions, which does strong work in blunting objections from those who would
charge incoherence against the Pluralist; but this motivation is not shared by the
MOPist, since she intends to endorse a Meinongian framework instead. Second, and
perhaps more critically, unlike the standard Pluralist’s claim about the English ‘there
are’, the Meinongian interpretation of the quantifier at work in (2) is taken to be
univocal, and not more perspicuously expressed by using a disjunction of more
natural, primitive quantifiers.
Fortunately, there are ways to formulate Ontological Pluralism without the use of
multiple primitive quantifiers. Instead, one can formulate it at the level of individuals
by appeal to multiple, first-order, existence properties. There are a number of ways this
might be further specified. For example, just as one might think having mass is a
determinable property with corresponding determinate properties such as being 3
grams and being 5 grams, the pluralist can claim that existence is a determinable
property with determinate properties such as being concrete and being abstract.
Another option is to treat existence as a disjunctive property, such that to exist is to
either be concrete, or abstract, or actual, etc. So long as there are multiple, existence
properties at least as fundamental as generic existence, the view is a pluralist one.5
5

Here, I have no intention of arguing for a specific set of determinate existence properties, but I submit
the MOPist should take a cue from other proponents of Pluralism who intend to utilize the view to capture
the deepest joints in the world.

5

Since Ontological Pluralism can be formulated this way, there is no obvious,
internal tension within MOP. This should come as little surprise given Meinong’s own
view. In any case, our initial characterization of Meinongianism then needs only the
following adjustments:
(1*) There are multiple, first-order, existence properties.
(2*) There are entities that lack all existence properties.
(1*) therein suffices for MOP’s status as a version of Pluralism and (2*) suffices for
its status as a version of Meinongianism.6 It is also evident that, so characterized, MOP
will be able to inherit the putative virtues of both Meinongianism and Ontological
Pluralism. Recall some of the theoretical utility of Meinongianism. First, because of the
scope of the Meinongian quantifier, there are no obvious problems accounting for
truths about non-existent entities, such as Pegasus. Second, no special pleading is
required for an analysis of the predicate ‘exists’. MOP straightforwardly inherits the
first since it just employs the Meinongian quantifier, and it inherits the second since,
according to MOP, all existence properties are ordinary first-order properties.
Recall also some of the theoretical utility of Ontological Pluralism. In addressing
metaphysical puzzles, the Pluralist can claim an entity exists in different ways, where
she might otherwise be forced to admit the entity exists (or not). Given the difficult
metaphysical challenge of what to make of holes, Kris McDaniel puts this virtue of
Pluralism as follows:7
6

This is provided that the quantifier in (2*) is taken to be a Meinongian quantifier, such as Priest’s ‘S’,
which ranges over non-existents.
7
As McDaniel acknowledges, this difficult challenge regarding almost nothings is captured well by

6

The ontological pluralist can happily say that there are holes and then diligently
pursue the question of in what way there are holes. By contrast, according to the
ontological monist, either something is or it isn’t, and that’s all there is say about a
thing’s existential status. This puts the ontological monist in an uncomfortable
position. According to her, everything that there is enjoys the same kind of reality,
which is the kind of reality enjoyed by full-fledged concrete entities such as
ourselves. She is committed to the unpleasant claim that holes are just as real as
concretia, a claim that is apt to be met with incredulous stares by those not
acquainted with contemporary metaphysics.8

Without specifying exactly what existences there are, we can still take on the
informative task of showing that MOP can express the same ways of being with
first-order properties as with the primitive quantifiers posited by the more familiar,
quantificational version of Ontological Pluralism. Hopefully one can preemptively see
how this might go, but let’s make it explicit the sake of clarity.
Suppose there are two kinds of existences that an entity might enjoy,
abstract-existence and concrete-existence. We could formulate that by claiming that
the ‘∃’ is more perspicuously expressed by a disjunction of the more natural quantifiers
‘∃a ’ and ‘∃c ’, representing abstract and concrete existence, respectively.9 The domains
of our Pluralist quantifiers might then look something like this:

∃c : {cars, tables, horses,...}

Sorensen (2008) who writes, “it feels paradoxical to say that absences exist—but no better to say that absences do not exist” and “...holes do not sit any more comfortably on the side of being than of nonbeing.”
8
See McDaniel (2017, §5.1).
9
In §1.3, I more thoroughly exposit the nuances of these quantifiers. They are meant to be taken as
both semantically primitive and restricted.

7

∃a : {the number 7, Sherlock Holmes, ∅,...}
On this supposition, the propositions that horses exist and the number 7 exists can be
expressed as: ∃c x(Hx) and ∃a x(x=7). Of course, the MOPist rejects this Quinean
formulation of the propositions and will deploy something like the Meinongian
quantifier, S (translated as ‘for some’ rather than ‘there exists’), along with the
appropriate existence predicate. The MOPist can express these same propositions;
rather than ∃c x(Hx), she will have Sx(Hx & E!c x); and rather than ∃a x(x=7), she will
have Sx(x=7 & E!a x), where E!c and E!a are the MOPist predicates that express the
first-order properties of concrete-existence and abstract-existence, each respectively.10
Indeed, for any primitive existential quantifier the Ontological Pluralist chooses to
posit, be they aimed at carving abstracta from concreta or not, the MOPist can appeal
to fundamental existential properties to express the same proposition.11 If this is right,
then MOP will inherit the aforementioned utility of Pluralism; that is, the MOPist is in
just as good of a position as the Pluralist in dealing with almost nothings—neither
need admit that if holes exist, they exist just the same as you and me.12
So far, the MOPist appears to have quite an appealing meta-ontology. Insofar as
Meinongianism and Ontological Pluralism both independently have tremendous
theoretical utility, MOP may have the sum of this utility. And no doubt when evaluating
various philosophical theories, an important consideration is how much theoretical
work the view can do—what puzzles it can solve and so on. Thus, to the extent that its
10

Following the standard, Meinongian convention, the ‘!’ signifies that the predicate denotes existence.
It may be more accurate to say these are equivalent propositions rather than the very same.
12
Of course, this is true not only of holes, but of any other thing the Pluralist may wish to claim exists
in a way distinct from the way you and I exist.
11

8

constituent meta-ontologies are on the table, as it were, so too MOP should be.
Perhaps that’s too quick. One might think it does not necessarily follow simply from
the fact that because MOP inherits the utility from its constituent views that MOP is
therein preferable to its constituent meta-ontologies. After all, plausibly, if MOP is to
inherit the resources Meinongianism and Ontological Pluralism, it will also inherit the
problems. That is, whatever objections there are that plague either Meinongianism or
Pluralism, it seems they will also plague MOP. And if that’s right, then perhaps the
benefits of the inherited utility fail to offset the costs of the inherited objections,
possibly leaving MOP less desirable a meta-ontology than its constituent views taken
independently. In the end, I don’t think this will be the case, because the objections we
might think a meta-ontology inherits by virtue of being both a Meinongian and a
Pluralist view ultimately fail to persist against MOP. The remainder of this chapter is
dedicated to addressing a some of these objections.

1.2

T HE C OUNTING A RGUMENT

One putative problem for Ontological Pluralism is called the Counting Argument. Peter
van Inwagen articulates the objection as follows:
No one would be inclined to suppose that number words like ‘six’ or ‘forty-three’
mean different things when they are used to count different sorts of objects. The
very essence of the applicability of arithmetic is that numbers may count anything:
if you have written thirteen epics and I own thirteen cats, then the number of your
epics is the number of my cats. But [being] is closely tied to number. To say that

9

[there are no unicorns] is to say something very much like saying that the number
of unicorns is 0; to say that [there are horses] is to say that the number of horses is
1 or more. The univocacy of number and the intimate connection between number
and [being] should convince us that there is at least very good reason to think that
[being] is univocal.13

Two main claims are being made in the above excerpt. First, number words and terms
do not shift meanings when they are used to count different things; number terms are
univocal. Second, there is an intimate relationship between quantification and
counting; namely, there is an equivalence between sentences of the form ‘there are no
Fs’ and sentences of the form ‘the number of Fs is zero.’14 Given these two claims, it
seems we should infer that quantifiers are similarly univocal, so the argument goes.
We can formulate the argument, CA, as follows:
(3) ‘There are no unicorns’ is true iff ‘the number of unicorns is zero’ is true.
(4) Number terms like ‘zero’ are univocal.
(5) Therefore, quantifiers like ‘there are’ are univocal.
(6) Therefore, Ontological Pluralism is false.
On the face of it, both premises in the argument have a strong prima facie plausibility.
Van Inwagen supports (4) by running various semantic tests for ambiguity. “If I say
that four is the number of the Stuart kings of England, the canonical Gospels, and the
13

See van Inwagen (1998, p. 236).
There are reasons to think that there is merely an equivalence (rather than an identity); for van
Inwagen, this distinction appears critical for making sense of the inside of the ontology room versus the
outside.
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cardinal points of the compass, that’s not a syllepsis like ‘Aunt Maude went home in a
short while, a flood of tears, and a Buick’.”15 That is, the failure to detect zeugma in a
sentence where a single number term is used to count things in different categories is
evidence that number terms are not equivocal.
If (3) and (4) are true, I grant that (5) follows. If ‘there are’ were equivocal—if (5)
were false—and we were to accept (4) because of the ambiguity tests, then we would
expect (3) to be false, since the biconditional would not hold unequivocally. Its truth
would depend on which quantifier were at play. Finally, (6) simply falls out of (5)
since equivocal quantifiers are constitutive of the familiar way of formalizing
Ontological Pluralism.16
Another way to frame the Counting Argument is as a dilemma for the Pluralist,
where the first horn is giving up (3) and the second horn is giving up (4).17 Given the
intuitive plausibility of both premises, biting the bullet on either of the horns is
undesirable.18
Interestingly, the MOPist is uniquely situated to reject the move to (6), for she can
respond as follows: “(6) does not follow for those who endorse pluralism as I do; there
are a plurality of existence properties, not a plurality of quantifiers. Indeed, natural
language may independently give us reason to think there is a privileged, univocal
quantifier—I concede this! But I needn’t abandon pluralism in accepting a univocal
15

See van Inwagen (2009b, p. 53).
Again, for the time being, I am bracketing version of pluralism that neither have linguistic baggage
nor rely on intuitions about ordinary language for motivation.
17
See Turner (2010, pp. 24-25).
18
As Turner puts it, “Neither option is completely unpalatable, although it is hard to savor the taste of
either.”
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quantifier.” As we have already seen, the MOPist deploys only one primitive quantifier,

S, and yet this clearly does not rule out her endorsing Pluralism, as she deploys
multiple, primitive, existence properties. The point here is that a Pluralist needn’t
abandon her view in light of the Counting Argument provided she endorses
Meinongianism, since Meinongians deny that quantificational phrases bear the
requisite relationship to existence predicates. The severing of this relationship affords
the MOPist with the resources to endorse a plurality of existences whilst preserving the
link between quantification and number. In short, the Counting Argument above puts
no pressure on the MOPist to abandon Pluralism as she formulates it.
Of course, there is a nearby analogous counting argument, CA*, one might try to
raise against the MOPist, one which van Inwagen would undoubtedly also endorse:
(3*) ‘Unicorns do not exist’ is true iff ‘the number of unicorns is zero’ is true.
(4*) Number terms like ‘zero’ are univocal.
(5*) Therefore, ‘exists’ is univocal.
(6*) Therefore, MOP is false.
Given his endorsement of the Quinean meta-ontology, this response should be wholly
unsurprising. Elsewhere, van Inwagen says, “When I say that affirmation of existence
is denial of the number zero, I mean only that to say that Fs exist is to say that the
number of Fs is not zero. For example, in my view, ‘Horses exist’ is equivalent to ‘The
number of horses is not zero’.”19 Of course, if an ontological monist thinks that to be is
19

See van Inwagen (2009a, p. 483).
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to be the value of a bound variable, then (3*) is entailed by (3). And (4*) is just (4).
So it may be natural to think that to the extent the Counting Argument is a compelling
objection against Ontological Pluralism, we should think that this new version is a
compelling objection against MOP. I submit this is not the case.
Recall, the MOPist finds CA to be compelling because, by her lights, there are
independent reasons from natural language for thinking that ‘there are’ is univocal;
this underlies her endorsement of C1. Being a pluralist, however, she takes seriously
the claim of the lay who are found saying that what it means to say tables exist is
something different than what it means to they say numbers exist; these claims are
evidence that the use facts of the predicate ‘exists’ likely does not pick out a single
fundamental property. So by the MOPist’s lights, there are independently motivated
reasons for denying (5*), that is, good reason for thinking ‘exists’ is equivocal. The
stronger these reasons, the more she will be willing to run the argument backwards
and reject (3*).
If lay testimony is taken to be insufficient, the MOPist may look to semantic tests
for ambiguity in order to proffer additional evidence against (5*). Just as the Counting
Argument was partly justified by running ambiguity tests on ‘there are’ to demonstrate
the lack of zeugma, the MOPist may attempt to run the same tests on the predicate
‘exists’ to show there is zeugma. If this can be done, then the defense of MOP against
the revised Counting Argument begins to look very strong.20 Consider the following
sentences:
20

If this cannot be done, the MOPist may still appeal to the work such a meta-ontology can do in order
to motivate her Pluralism apart from equivocation in natural language.
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(7) Mercury, Venus, Earth, and Mars exist.
(8) Numbers exist.
(9) Mercury, Venus, Earth, Mars, and numbers exist.
First, reflect on what ordinary competent English speakers mean by (7).21 Then do the
same with (8). Now consider (9). In (9), I myself find some of the strangeness
constitutive of zeugma. Though far less pronounced then that found in ‘Aunt Maude
went home in a Buick and a flood of tears,’ it is nevertheless present. This suggests that
‘exists’ is indeed equivocal, as it seems to operate with different meanings on different
parts of the sentence. If this is right, then the MOPist is well-positioned to reject (5*).
Importantly, the MOPist would therein also be well-positioned to accept the
intimate link between quantification and number, but deny the link between existence
and number.22 Thus, provided that the Counting Argument is a problem for
Ontological Pluralists of the traditional sort, MOP appears to inherit no such objection.

1.3

T HE P ROBLEM

OF

M IXED O NTOLOGICAL S TATUS

Recently, Akiko Frischhut and Alexander Skiles have argued that PAPE-ism, an
Ontological Pluralist theory about the metaphysics of time and modality, though
appealing, succumbs to what they call “the problem of mixed ontological status”.23 In
21

It is difficult, but necessary, to set aside one’s theoretical commitments in order to properly execute
the test; the goal is to isolate features of English predicates—most certainly not predicates of Ontologese.
22
We should also note that though the success of such an ambiguity test would strengthen the case for
MOP, the view needn’t rest on such a test. After all, the metaphysician may think that natural language
has a rather restricted role when writing the book of the world. She may simply theorize that Ex is a less
natural property than Ea x and Ec x; as it turns out, doing so generates a powerful theory.
23
See Frischhut and Skiles (2013).
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light of this problem, they conclude that proponents of PAPE-ism must abandon their
view, or develop it in a different way.24 I take myself to be undertaking the latter
option. Before showing how the MOPist can respond, we should be clear on PAPE-ism
and the putative problem.
PAPE-ism was initially conceived as a response to the putative inconsistency
between the three following commonsensical claims: First, the non-present and the
non-actual are less real than the present and the actual. Second, all truths (including
those about the non-present and non-actual) must be made true by something real.
And third, the present, actual things are not able to ground all the truths;
commonsense has it that Plato is long gone and therein unable to make facts about
what he could or couldn’t have been true. Eternalists and possibilists, of course, will
reject the first claim.25 Others reject the second claim, arguing either that not all
truthmakers need to be real, or that not all truths need truthmakers.26 Still others
reject the third claim, insisting that all truths have present, actual truthmakers.27
The Ontological Pluralist appears to correctly identify that the above trilemma
arises only against the ontological monist, for if there are ways of existing such that
some ways are more real than others, then she has available the option of claiming
that non-present and non-actual entities are real—less real than the present and
actual, but real enough to ground the relevant truths. So by the Pluralist’s lights, there
24

This problem, as Frischhut and Skiles note, is targeted only at Pluralists who would simultaneously
apply their quantifiers to handle the non-present and the non-actual.
25
See Sider (2001) and Lewis (1986).
26
See Gallois (2004) and Merricks (2007).
27
See Caplan and Sanford (2011).
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is no trilemma to be had, and therefore no reason to hastily reject one of the
commonsense claims; so much the worse for the monist. PAPE-ism is an attempt to
precisely work out a Pluralist view so as to genuinely diffuse the trilemma.
In order to explicate the view, the Pluralist will help herself to two concepts.28 The
first is that of a semantically primitive, restricted quantifier. Consider the familiar
quantifier, ∃, which ranges over everything there is. Call a restricted quantifier one
which ranges over a proper subset of the entities in the domain of ∃. Call such a
restricted quantifier a semantically primitive one if it is not defined (even partly) in
terms of ∃. The second concept is that of comparative naturalness, which can apply to
expressions in any grammatical category.29 Now the PAPE-ist can make sense of the
following five semantically primitive restricted quantifiers. Say that ∃was ranges over
what is past, ∃now over what is present, ∃will over what is future, ∃♦ over what is merely
possible, and ∃@ over what is actual. PAPE-ism can then be characterized as follows:30
PAPE (1): ∃was , ∃will , and ∃♦ are semantically primitive restricted quantifier
expressions that are at least as natural as ∃.
PAPE (2): ∃now is a semantically primitive restricted quantifier expression
that is more natural than ∃was and ∃will , and ∃@ is a semantically primitive
restricted quantifier expression that is more natural than ∃♦ .
And finally, in order to do the intended work, the PAPE-ist is committed to a connection
28

See Frischhut and Skiles (2013) for a more thorough setup of the view. This originates in McDaniel
(2009).
29
See Lewis (1983) and Sider (2013).
30
See Frischuut and Skiles (2013, pp. 266-267).
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between the truths expressed using her primitive quantifiers and temporal/modal
truths expressed without her quantifiers. Specifically, she is committed to the fact that
if there was a dinosaur (one not included in ∃now or ∃will ), then ∃was ranges over a
dinosaur. Additionally, she is committed to the fact that if ∃was ranges over a dinosaur,
then there was a dinosaur. The former commitment can be expressed with the
following principle (followed by the same principle governing possible truths):31

σ was : □((was(∃x)(Φx) ∧ ¬(∃now y)(∃will z)(Φy ∨ Φz)) ⊃ (∃x)(Φx ∧ (∃was y)(x = y)))
Necessarily (and always), if there was some x (where x is in the domain of
neither the present nor future quantifiers), then x is in the domain of the past
quantifier.

σ ♦ : □((♦(∃x)(Φx) ∧ ¬(∃@ y)(Φy)) ⊃ (∃x)(Φx ∧ (∃♦ y)(x = y)))
Necessarily (and always), if it is possible that there is some x (where x is not in
the domain of the actual quantifier), then x is in the domain of the possible
quantifier.
The latter commitment can be expressed:

τ was : □((∃was x)(Φx) ⊃ was(∃x)(Φx))
Necessarily (and always), if some x is in the domain of the past quantifier, then
there was the x.
Given the characterization of PAPE-ism we have now, alongside its proponent’s further
commitments, we can see how the ontology might dissolve the putative inconsistency
31

There are of course the same principles regarding the other PAPE-ist quantifiers as well, but we only
need these two in order to set up the problem.
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between our three commonsense claims. The PAPE-ist can endorse the first claim, that
non-present and the non-actual things are less real than the present and actual things;
Plato enjoys past-existence which is less real than present-existence (PAPE 2). She can
endorse the second claim, that all truths are made true by something real; for her,
there are more things than simply the present, actual ones.32 Finally, she can endorse
the third claim, conceding that the resources of only the present and actual things are
insufficient to ground all the truths there are. An attractive solution, so it seems.
As it has been formulated, PAPE-ism faces what Frischhut and Skiles call the
problem of mixed ontological status, which we can reconstruct as a reductio:
(10) It is possible that there was a talking donkey (included in neither ∃now nor

∃will ).
(11) So, it is possible that there is a talking donkey included in ∃was . (1, σ was )
(12) So, included in ∃♦ , there is a talking donkey also included in ∃was . (2, σ ♦ )
(13) So, there is a talking donkey included in ∃was . (3)
(14) So, there was a talking donkey. (4, τ was )
Of course, there were never any talking donkeys. Thus, given we accept (10),
PAPE-ism has led us astray. Jason Turner has responded on behalf of the Pluralist by
arguing that should we concede the Frischhut and Skiles’s argument is valid, we
needn’t think the conclusion is particularly undesirable.33 As a Pluralist, the PAPE-ist
32

As it turns out, the PAPE-ist agrees in general with the Eternalist about all the things that exist.
Indeed, she concedes that Plato exists, just in a non-present way; nevertheless, we have no reason to
deny Plato the power to truth-make, as it were.
33
See Turner (2013).
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might be a modal realist, who can make clear sense of how there are indeed talking
donkeys located earlier than the moving spotlights in their respective worlds—that
truly there were talking donkeys. This seems quite right.
Another of Turner’s insights is that it appears the mixing of ontological statuses is
rather orthogonal to the lurking concern, since the problem arises even in the temporal
case alone.34 Given the PAPE-ist affirms the reality of past, present, and future
existents, but gives a special status to the present, the view is something of a spotlight
theory; the glow of the spotlight is a way of being and although the light once shone
upon dinosaurs, it now no longer does. The PAPE-ist understands this as: it is not the
case, though it was the case, that dinosaurs were included in ∃now . So, ∃now is shifty;
and if there is a concern here, it is this rather than the mixing of modal and temporal
ways of being. “Claims about the spotlight’s motion are recalcitrant to grounding.”35
There are further moves for the PAPE-ist to make, but here I hope to draw attention
to an important way in which the MOPist has a distinct advantage as a result of her
Meinongian resources. First, because the MOPist does not make appeal to a plurality of
quantifiers, she is not stuck with a shifty ∃now . Alas, there is only one quantifier in her
book of the world, S. This does not put her in a better position than the PAPE-ist with
respect to the bruteness of certain facts about the spotlight’s movement, but plausibly,
she is in a position to offer a more perspicuous metaphysical account.
Some of the initial fear regarding a shifty domain for a natural quantifier might be
the lack of metaphysical precedence. Perhaps we might have been on board with an
34
35

See Turner (2013, pp. 278-279).
See Turner (2013, p. 279). See also Cameron (2015).
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abstract way of being and a concrete way of being, but abstracta do not become
concreta, or the other way around. If all a Quinean needs to do to understand the
pluralist ontology is to take all the things that fall under the domain of her ‘∃’ and
draw a line down the middle to demarcate abstract from concreta, it’s quite easy for her
to go along for the expositional ride. But if the domains are instead past, present, and
future, and entities shift from being in the domain of ∃will into the domain of ∃now and
then into the domain of ∃was , an incredulous stare will likely be in the wake.
In contrast, MOP is not as scandalous. Ways of being are understood as familiar
first-order properties of things; and intuition does not clash with the notion that
entities can come to gain and lose properties. Consequently, the MOPist needn’t say
that there is shiftiness in what there is, only in what things are like, which is plausibly
a more natural expression of the intuitions behind the moving spotlight theory to begin
with.
The MOPist is therein at an advantage over the mere ontological pluralist on
account of a more compelling response to the problem of mixed ontological status. In
giving the metaphysical story with respect to the temporal shiftiness concern, she needs
only to appeal to a commonplace kind of event, whereas the PAPE-ist must also
motivate an understanding of a shifty, primitive quantifier. Further, though this latter
project seems feasible, it may run contrary to the intuitions of many who are attracted
to the moving spotlight view.
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1.4

T HE C HARACTERIZATION P ROBLEM

Meinongians think there are non-existent entities, and therein owe a principle that
explains what entities there are, and what kinds of properties they can have. Call this a
comprehension or characterization principle. In its most naive form, the principle says
that for any condition Ax with free variable x, there is an object that satisfies Ax.36 This
gets the Meinongian all of the entities she wants, but the principle as stated seems
unacceptable. Graham Priest presents the problem as follows:
The CP [(Characterization Principle)] cannot be accepted in this form, for it entails
the existence of something satisfying any condition. Let A(x) be any property. Let
B be A(x) ∧ Ex. Applying the CP to B we get an object cB such that A(cB ) ∧ EcB .
So Sx(A(x) ∧ Ex). Worse, let A be any sentence one likes, and let B be x = x ∧ A.
Apply the CP to B, and we get an object, cB , such that cB = cB ∧ A, from which A
follows. So we have proved an arbitrary A. For this reason, no noneist has even
accepted the CP in its pristine form. The standard response, from Meinong
onwards, has been to accept it only if the properties deployed in the CP are of a
certain kind: assumptible, characterizing, nuclear, the names vary. And existence
(among others) is not such a predicate. The problem for this line is to give a
principled characterization of what constitutes a characterizing predicate and why.
No one, as far as I am aware, has been able to do this. Certain classes of predicates
can be circumscribed and deemed safe. But without an appropriate rationale, it is
difficult to avoid the feeling that the class has been gerrymandered simply to avoid
36

Terence Parsons (1980) calls this the Unrestricted Comprehension Principle.
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problems.37

The problem here is (at least) tripartite. First, it appears the characterization principle
can be used to prove the existence of anything. Second, and even worse, it appears the
principle can be used to prove any arbitrary claim. And third, attempts to hedge the
principle appear inappropriately ad hoc.
Let’s start with the first problem. No doubt the force of the worry comes from the
fear of a reductio. Perhaps the thought is something like this: If the CP can be used to
prove the existence of unicorns, something has surely gone awry, since unicorns do not
exist. And it is easy to see why this would be problematic, if we take ontological
monism for granted. But the MOPist is an ontological pluralist, and as we have
previously noted, she might well endorse modal realism and claim that there are
genuine possible worlds which have possible-existence. If she does so, then the
reductio will fail, since the MOPist happily accepts the existence of possible beings such
as unicorns—they just don’t exist in the actual world.
What about the second, stronger problem? From the CP it not only follows that
Sherlock Holmes exists but also that the sky is green. Again, given the resources of
modal realism (motivated by Pluralism), the MOPist will be happy to relegate the truth
of any way a world could be to some existing state of affairs in some possible world.
Indeed, there is a world where Holmes exists and the sky is green, so it seems the CP
does not generate unwanted truths for the MOPist.
This is surely too quick a response to the Characterization Problem. Consider
37

See Priest (2005, p. 83).
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impossible entities. There are no possible round squares, but round squares can
nevertheless be characterized; they are round, after all. But if round squares can be
characterized as having roundness, then they can be characterized as having, say,
actual-existence. So the deep problem is extant.
By borrowing Priest’s strategy on behalf of the MOPist, we have blunted some of
the force of the first and second problems by committing to the existence of possibilia,
but still it seems the MOPist cannot endorse the CP in full generality. If she were to do
so, she would betray her commitment to the claim that there are things that lack all
existence properties, since everything would exist in some way or another. Thus, as
other Meinongians have attempted, the MOPist must hedge the CP. A notoriously
daunting challenge. “The standard response, from Meinong onwards, has been to
accept it only if the properties deployed in the CP are of a certain kind: assumptible,
characterizing, nuclear, the names vary. And existence (among others) is not such a
predicate.”38
In undertaking this project, some Meinongians have naturally engaged a two-fold
challenge. The first fold is to circumscribe the safe (i.e. non-existence-entailing)
properties, and the second is to offer an explanation for why the safe ones are safe.39
However, this is not the only way for the Meinongian to go. Here, I submit the MOPist
will reject this challenge. There is no need to delineate between safe and unsafe
properties. If we already think there are ways of being, then there is nothing
additionally odd about thinking there are ways to have properties—that there are
38
39

See Priest (2005, p. 83).
See Parsons (1980). This sort of strategy is one suggested by Ernst Mally (1912).
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different candidate relations that obtain between an object and its properties. Call the
ways of predication internal and external,40 or implicit and explicit,41 or encoding and
exemplifying,42 if you wish. Regardless of the locutions we choose here, we note that it
is the way of having the property, e.g. via exemplification, that existence of some sort is
entailed. The MOPist then has no worry about which properties are or are not
existence-entailing, and therein needn’t attempt the precarious task of sorting
properties into safe and unsafe. Which kinds of properties are available for the CP to
use is wide open. The MOPist will therein happily admit that round squares have
roundness and existence, so long as the having amounts to something like encoding.
Let’s be clear about the MOPist response. The CP appears to generate the existence
of anything and everything, and worse, prove any arbitrary claim. One common
solution in light of this problem is to limit which properties can be fed to the CP. But
attempts to demarcate these properties seem arbitrary and therein ad hoc. The MOPist
notes that her Pluralism presents a motivated response: that the having of properties
also comes in ways.43 And if that’s right, then she needn’t demarcate the safe from
unsafe. Rather, she needs only to claim that one way of having a property is
existence-entailing and another is not. There are, of course, other routes to motivate
different ways of instantiating properties—dual copula views and so forth—but insofar
as the Meinongian takes up the challenge of picking out safe properties (e.g. the
40

See Castañeda (1974).
See Fine (1982).
42
See Zalta (1983, 1988).
43
See Turner (2010) for a similar claim about the resources of Pluralism with respect to a plurality of
numbering relations.
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assumptible, the nuclear, etc.), the pluralist resources of MOP generates a more
attractive solution to the Characterization Problem; and even with respect to those
other ways of motivating distinct “having” relations, one might still find the MOPist
solution preferable on the grounds that it can be more semantically “conservative.”44

1.5

T HE U PSHOT

Undoubtedly there is much more to say here. There are likely other objections lurking
nearby. But the objective here has not been so ambitious as to argue for the truth, or
even the probable truth, of MOP. Rather, I have only sought to argue that
Meinongianism and Ontological Pluralism complement one another. MOP inherits
much of the utility of Meinongianism (e.g. fittingness with natural language, a more
systematic analysis of predicates, etc.) and also Ontological Pluralism (e.g. fittingness
with our intuitions about different ways to exist, accounting for almost nothings, etc.).
Further, jointly endorsing Meinongianism and Ontological Pluralism affords one with
the resources to respond to putatively extant problems for the views held
independently. Minimally, I hope to have shown that the MOPist’s responses to such
objections are better than the ones offered in defense of the views held alone. So to
the Meinongians I say, be Pluralists. And to the Pluralists I say, be Meinongians. Most
everyone else should find MOP more attractive than Meinongianism and Pluralism
taken separately.
44

Semanticists are often reluctant to say any word is ambiguous, so if ontological pluralism can motivate a plurality of “having” relations without appeal to an ambiguous copula, then plausibly the MOPist
needn’t take on any semantic theses we might independently be averse to. The same is not true for views
such as Zalta’s. See Partee (1986, 1987) for a well known defense of the unambiguous copula.
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Part II
Some Applications
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2

Meinongian Alethic Pluralism

2.1

I NTRODUCTION

Recent metaontological debates over ontology itself have brought to light how theories
of existence might bear on other metaphysical issues. Here, I am focused on the
connection between these metaontologies and truth. More specifically, I am interested
in determining which metaontological approaches are most consonant with our
intuitions about truth. Insofar as one theory is the best at vindicating these intuitions,
we have reason to endorse that theory.
One trouble is, as I will point out, that two of our intuitions about truth seem to be
at odds with one another. This has resulted in philosophers vindicating one intuition at
the cost of betraying the other. In this paper, I argue that there is a metaontological
view, a Meinongian one, that is well-situated to vindicate both intuitions. In short, this
is because the Meinongian distinction between exemplification and
encoding/characterization motivates a weak form of alethic pluralism that can diffuse
the apparent tension. This gives us some reason to prefer Meinongianism over its
rivals.
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My plan is as follows. In §2, I briefly articulate the metaontological players and
motivate the puzzle that arises from our intuitions about truth. In §3, I show how
Meinongianism can motivate just the right kind of alethic pluralism that can be used to
solve the puzzle. In §4, I respond to a number of likely objections. Among these
objections are that the appeal to alethic pluralism is too radical a solution for the
severity of the problem and that rival pluralist views about truth can solve the puzzle
without appeal to the Meinongian machinery.

2.2

M OTIVATING

THE

P UZZLE

Quineans take the key ontological question to be, what is there?1 Fundamentalists take
the key question to instead be, what is fundamental?2 Quineans and Fundamentalists
seem to represent a large majority of contemporary metaphysicians. While they have
substantive metaontological disagreements, there is a noteworthy point of agreement.
Both appear to agree with the following. If one’s ontology doesn’t include some things,
then the truths about those things need to be explained in terms of other things that
are included.3 Of course, the strategies here will differ; the Quinean will offer a
paraphrase4 and the Fundamentalist will tell a grounding story.5 Critically, both agree
there is a robust sense in which truth depends on the realm of being. Call this point of
1

See Quine (1948).
See Fine (2001, 2005, 2009). Roughly, the key is the distinction between what there really is and
what there is derivatively.
3
This insight comes from Von Solodkoff and Woodward (2013).
4
See Quine (1960, 1981) and van Inwagen (1998).
5
For examples of different types of Fundamentalism, see Schaffer (2009), Sider (2009), and Cameron
(2010).
2
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agreement, D EPENDENCE. D EPENDENCE is deeply intuitive and seems to underly
correspondence theories in general.
Noneism is the view that there are things that do not exist.6 Noneists are often
further characterized by two more commitments, Neutral Quantification and the
Principle of Independence. According to the former, there is a pair of quantifiers, general
and particular, which range over both existent and non-existent entities. Loaded
quantification is defined up with an existence predicate, ‘E!’.7 According to the latter,
the sosein of an object (i.e. its properties) is independent of its sein (i.e. its being).8 On
this view, then, objects can have properties, yet fail to have being. And if this is
possible, it can be true that Sherlock Holmes is a detective—straightforwardly—yet
also be nonexistent.9 So, Noneists think the realm of non-being plays a role in
determining truth, and therein reject D EPENDENCE.
Among what the Noneist gets in return are the resources to easily account for
commonsense truths about nonexistents, such as, Pegasus can fly, or round squares are
round—truths that otherwise demand more philosophical theorizing. ‘Sherlock
Holmes is a detective’ is true because the thing denoted by ‘Sherlock Holmes’ has the
property denoted by the predicate ‘is a detective’. There is no novel semantic account
being offered here, even though the subject denotes a nonexistent thing; truths about
nonexistents are true in the same way as truths about existents. In this way, Noneists
6

See Routley (1980, 1982) and Priest (2005).
See Priest (2008) for a brief history on particular quantification and its existential baggage.
8
This is typically not taken in full generality.
9
By ‘straightforwardly’, I mean to say the semantic structure of the sentence is just as we would expect,
given its surface. The name successfully refers, and the proposition is true because the referent has the
property denoted by the predicate. No surprising paraphrase or truth-maker story, no hidden fictionalist
operator, etc.
7
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preserve a kind of unity in their semantics that they would otherwise have to betray.
This is ultimately made possible because Noneism divorces quantification from
existence, making reference to nonexistents coherent.
What we find, then, is that while the Noneist must give up D EPENDENCE, they
vindicate the deep intuition that we can assert straightforward truths about—and
quantify over, refer to, think about, etc.—nonexistent entities. Call this intuition,
R EFERENCE.
Philosophers steeped in theory may be tempted to resist the claim that R EFERENCE
is intuitive. Quineans, for example, might appeal to the putative link between
quantifier phrases such as ‘there are’ and the predicate ‘exists’. They are likely to insist
that propositions of the form ‘there are Fs’ are equivalent to propositions of the form
‘Fs exist’. If there is a deep connection here in the way the Quineans claim, then it
could never be true that there are non-existent entities.10
The point is not that R EFERENCE is true, but that it is intuitive. It may very well be
that after we begin theorizing we find that R EFERENCE is not worth endorsing. This,
though, is to be settled dialectically downstream.11 For evidence that R EFERENCE is
intuitive, one need only look to ordinary discourse where quantification over (and
reference to) nonexistents is commonplace.
So a challenge emerges for those who find both D EPENDENCE and R EFERENCE
intuitive. From this vantage point, Quineans and Fundamentalists vindicate the former
10

By ‘Quinean’, I mean to denote the view according to which there is a single, fundamental sense of
‘exists’ and it is to be captured with the existential quantifier. See van Inwagen (1998).
11
On my view, this is to be settled by cost-benefit analysis a la David Lewis (1986).
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and betray the latter while the Noneists vindicate the latter and betray the former. This
is unfortunate. If there is a metaontological approach that is amenable to both
intuitions, we have good reason to endorse that approach, all things being equal. In
what follows, I argue there is such a view.

2.3

M EINONGIAN A LETHIC P LURALISM

2.3.1

Meinongianism and the Dual Copula Strategy

The approach I aim to defend here might be thought to be a version of Noneism with
some additions. However, to avoid terminological confusion, I will characterize the
approach I defend as a version of Meinongianism.12
For simplicity, here I take Meinongianism to be any metaontological view on which
existence is a first-order property that some entities lack.13 Sometimes, Meinongians
deploy the Dual Copula Strategy (DCS) according to which the copula ‘is’ is
ambiguous.14 Proponents of DCS have argued there are two distinct relations that can
obtain between individuals and properties—exemplification and encoding.15 Following
the logical convention, ‘Fa’ means a exemplifies F, while ‘aF’ means a encodes F.
To illustrate the difference between the two distinct kinds of predication, consider
12

In the debate over nonexistents, ‘Noneism’ is often understood as the view Graham Priest (2005)
defends, which Berto (2008) calls Modal Meinongianism. Noneists of this sort deploy an “other worlds”
strategy according to which reference to nonexistent objects is reference to non-actual objects; these
might be entities in merely possible or impossible worlds.
13
This is not an attempt to characterize Meinong’s own view, but rather contemporary metaontological
views which are relevantly similar.
14
See Zalta (1983). See Bueno and Zalta (2017) for the contrast between Zalta’s Object Theory and
Priest’s Modal Meinongianism.
15
These relations are sometimes given different names; here I follow Zalta (1983, 1988).
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Sherlock Holmes. This likely involves the properties of wearing a deerstalker hat and
smoking a pipe, but Sherlock does not really exemplify these properties. He is, of
course, not a hat-wearing, pipe-smoking individual like you or I might be. This is
because if you—a concrete thing—were to have the property of wearing a hat, you
would exemplify it. Sherlock, being a merely, intentional entity, encodes his properties.
In both cases, the properties are the same, but the way in which they are had differs.
Importantly, proponents of DCS typically think the various relations that obtain
between individuals and properties track ontological kinds.16 This should be
unsurprising given the kinds of intuitive cases which motivate the distinction.

2.3.2

From DCS to Alethic Pluralism

Roughly, alethic pluralism is the view that there is more than one kind of truth. The
alethic pluralist theories on offer vary quite greatly in a number of ways, but all of
them generally claim that different domains of discourse are associated with distinct
truth properties.17 What makes propositions true in scientific discourse, for example,
might differ from what makes propositions true in, say, moral discourse.
DCS and alethic pluralism bear a natural fit to one another. On DCS, objects of
different kinds have properties in different ways. Suppose Tarski’s T-schema which
states: ‘a is F’ is true iff a is F.18 By the lights of the DCS theorist, the schema is more
16
On Mally’s (1912) view, for example, it is abstracta and concreta that have their properties in different
ways.
17
For examples, see Wright (1992, 2003), Lynch (2000, 2009), Sher (2004), Pederson (2010), and
Edwards (2011, 2018). On some of the weaker forms of alethic pluralism—Sher (2004), for example—
all truth is truth by correspondence, but the “form” of correspondence varies across domains.
18
See Tarski (1933, 1952). For a recent, systematic treatment of Tarski’s views on truth, see Ray (2018).
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perspicuously expressed, ‘a is F’ is true iff Fa or aF. If truth is a property of propositions,
but there are two fundamentally distinct ways of building up these propositions, one
might be skeptical that the DCS theorist has not already betrayed alethic monism.
Put another way, suppose, following Tarski, that truth is satisfaction. An atomic
sentence ‘a is F’ is true when the object referred to by ‘a’ satisfies the predicate ‘is F’.
Here, the DCS theorist may insist that exemplification and encoding are two distinct
ways to satisfy a predicate. If truth is satisfaction, and there are multiple ways to
satisfy, then minimally, there is a deep joint that carves apart truths of one kind from
truths of the other. This doesn’t necessarily commit the DCS theorist to alethic
pluralism, but the fit is undeniable, and should the friend of DCS endorse alethic
pluralism, the move would be well-motivated. Natural joints of this sort are precisely
the sorts of cases pluralists of different sorts use to motivate their theories.19 So there
is a bridge from the Meinongian metaontological approach to alethic pluralism in the
sense that those who endorse the former are well-positioned to endorse the latter.

2.3.3

Alethic Pluralism at Work

Not all forms of alethic pluralism are helpful for resolving our original puzzle. To
illustrate, consider Douglas Edwards’ recent defense.20 There are the domains of
discourse, each of which is connected to a truth property. The truths of some domains,
19
It is widely accepted that there is natural joint between the abstract and the concrete. Accepting this
does not commit one to ontological pluralism, but it is precisely the kind of case that might motivate
ontological pluralism. The domains of objects seem so fundamentally different that one grows skeptical
that they enjoy the same sort of being. Perhaps it is more accurate to say that while both exist, they do
not exist in the same way. See the introductory chapter of McDaniel (2017).
20
See Edwards (2018).
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such as the physical and chemical, are true by correspondence, while the truths of
other domains, such as the moral and aesthetic, are true by superassertability. What
determines which truth properties are assigned to which domains? In short, domains
are comprised of predicates that either track sparse properties or abundant ones.
Domains that track the former are connected with correspondence, while domains that
track the latter are connected with superasserability. The predicates in physics, for
example, are “responsive” to objective similarities and differences in reality, and so pick
out sparse properties; so, the truths of the physical domain are true by correspondence.
The original puzzle arises because of the difficulty of simultaneously endorsing
both D EPENDENCE and R EFERENCE. Alethic pluralism can aid in resolving the tension if
it turns out that the cases which give rise to those intuitions turn out to track two
distinct kinds of truth that we have been unintentionally conflating. That is, if the
cases which generate D EPENDENCE are all truths of one kind, and the cases which
generate R EFERENCE are of another, then we can undermine the tension by claiming
that there is an important sense in which the two intuitions are not at odds with one
another. For example, there is no tension between D EPENDENCE and R EFERENCE if
‘truth’ means truth1 in the former and truth2 in the latter.
This won’t work with Edwards’ account, because the cases that give rise to the
puzzle don’t neatly track the sparse-abundant distinction. What we need is for there to
be one kind of truth for truths about reality and another for truths about unreality. The
sparse-abundant distinction won’t work here because both real and unreal things can
have both sparse and abundant properties.
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My proposal is simple. Distinguish real discourse from unreal discourse. This neatly
divides the intuitive cases which give rise to D EPENDENCE and R EFERENCE from the
beginning.21 As we have already seen, the Meinongian has a motivated and principled
way to demarcate the two by appeal to DCS. The truth property connected to real
discourse can be stipulated to be such that truth depends on being, thereby vindicating
D EPENDENCE. We can further stipulate that the truths of both the real and unreal
discourses are truth by correspondence so as to preserve the semantic unity
underwriting R EFERENCE.22 Call this view, Meinongian Alethic Pluralism (MAP).
Let’s take stock. We began by noting that some popular metaontological views
naturally end up betraying at least one of two deep intuitions about truth because the
two intuitions appear to be in tension. Meinongianism, as I have characterized it,
needn’t betray either. This is because Meinongians have independent reasons for
deploying DCS, which, as it turns out, can motivate precisely the right kind of alethic
pluralism to explain away the putative tension. This constitutes reason to prefer
Meinongianism—MAP in particular—over its rivals.

2.4

O BJECTIONS

The argument I just offered is quite ambitious insofar as it engages with and aims to
connect multiple, relatively insular literatures. Naturally, then, there will be many
objections. Here, I offer some preemptive rejoinders.
21

The cases which give rise to D EPENDENCE are familiar—‘snow is white’ is true because snow is white,
or ‘I am sitting’ is true because I am sitting. The cases which give rise to R EFERENCE are truths about
nonexistents (e.g. Sherlock Holmes lives at 221B Baker Street, or round squares are round).
22
This view is akin to Sher’s (2004) moderate alethic pluralism on which truth is both one and many.
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Objection 1: Appealing to alethic pluralism is ad hoc. The rough thought here is that
this sort of appeal is always available, so it looks infelicitous. Whenever one
encounters a puzzle or paradox wherein two claims are discovered to be incompatible,
we can make the puzzle vanish by stipulating that there is actually no incompatibility
because the claims are true in different ways. So, alethic pluralism looks to be more of
a cheat than a genuine solution.
I acknowledge that this might be the natural, first impression, but it is ultimately
misguided. Whether or not a philosophical move is ad hoc depends on whether it has
any other motivation other than merely to make the relevant problem go away. As I
have argued, the Meinongian has principled, and independently motivated reasons for
endorsing both DCS and MAP.
Objection 2: MAP does not really vindicate both intuitions. According to MAP, all
truths are true by correspondence, but only the truth associated with the real discourse
is such that truth depends on being. D EPENDENCE, though, was supposed to be about
truth in general, not just some of the truths. So it looks like MAP fails to truly vindicate
D EPENDENCE. If so, it fails as a solution to the puzzle.
It is true that, according to MAP, some truths—the ones pertaining to the
unreal—do not depend on being. But this is not a serious betrayal of D EPENDENCE.
First, by the lights of the view, it is apt to say that truth depends on being. Indeed in
the real discourse, all truths do depend on being. Second, and perhaps more
importantly, the kinds of cases which generate D EPENDENCE to begin with all find
themselves in the real discourse. Because MAP successfully captures the the cases
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which generate D EPENDENCE, I submit D EPENDENCE is vindicated.
Objection 3: Adopting alethic pluralism is too radical a solution. Some might find
themselves recognizing that it would be preferable to find a metaontology on which
they needn’t give up either D EPENDENCE or R EFERENCE, but think that the severity of
this problem does not license a solution as extreme as alethic pluralism.
I am sympathetic to the notion that the benefit of adopting a solution might be
worth less than its cost. This is not the case here. In order to properly deploy this
cost-benefit analysis, we need to be clear about a few things. First, the alethic
pluralism of MAP is not particularly radical. Unlike for many other versions of alethic
pluralism, truth is still unified in an important way, since all truth is truth by
correspondence. Second, depending on how valuable one takes the benefit of
vindicating both D EPENDENCE and R EFERENCE, it might not matter if MAP does turn
out to be radical. If someone recognizes both of these points, yet still insists that
alethic pluralism is too extreme or costly a proposal, we likely disagree about the value
and/or role of intuition in our theorizing more generally.23
Objection 4: DCS, not Meinongianism, is what solves the puzzle. DCS is the key to
motivating alethic pluralism of the sort MAP is. This is because the
exemplification-encoding distinction does the work of demarcating the real and unreal
discourses. If this is right, then one might think a non-Meinongian could deploy DCS
to the same effect as MAP.
First, recall that the aim here is in part to explore the connections between
23

Those who think, for example, that intuitions count for very little, or nothing at all, will likely be
disposed to Objection 3. This topic is unfortunately too large to adequately address here.
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metaontological views and truth. DCS is not itself a metaontology and so the fact that
DCS does the heavy lifting is tangential to the question of which metaontologies fair
best with respect to our intuitions about truth. Second, it’s not at all obvious that DCS
can be plucked from the Meinongian framework and deployed elsewhere. Recall that
DCS is itself motivated only if we take the problem of nonexistents seriously. So we
should expect that DCS has metaontological implications. A contemporary Quinean
view on which talk of nonexistents is metaphysical nonsense, for example, will be at
odds with DCS.
To sum up, there is a route from Meinongianism to alethic pluralism by way of
DCS. The package of views I proposed, MAP, nicely resolves the putative tension
between D EPENDENCE and R EFERENCE. Insofar as this is right, we’ve discovered that
the Meinongian metaontology has more utility than we previously thought, which
gives us more reason to accept it.
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3

From MOP to Mereological Pluralism

3.1

I NTRODUCTION

Contemporary defenders of ontological pluralism often point to the resources their
respective theories have to either resolve extant philosophical puzzles or provide novel
insight into otherwise opaque philosophical doctrines.1 I aim to further this by
exploring how pluralism of the ontological sort might connect with pluralism of the
mereological sort. I argue that while the varieties of pluralism do not entail one
another, there is a fittingness between the two—one such that, as will become clear,
they make for an attractive package.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In §2, I introduce both ontological and
mereological pluralism. In §3, I argue that ontological pluralism is uniquely situated to
motivate mereological pluralism. In §4, I explore some implications for the
extensionality of proper parthood given mereological pluralism. In §5, I use the
implications to gesture at solutions to familiar metaphysical puzzles, such as the
problem of material constitution.
1

See McDaniel (2017).
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I conclude with a few lessons, but I focus on one. Ontological pluralists have a clear
route to solutions for some familiar mereological puzzles. Thus, the impressive catalog
of things ontological pluralism can do for us grows ever longer.

3.2

T HE S ETUP

3.2.1

Ontological Pluralism

Ontological pluralism is the view that there are ways of being—or that there are
different ways to exist. The theory is often said to capture the intuitive view that what
we mean when we say that tables exist is something other than what we mean when
we say numbers exist.2 Recent proponents of ontological pluralism have formulated
the doctrine by invoking a plurality of semantically primitive, restricted quantifiers.3
There are other ways of formulating pluralism, but given the popularity of the
neo-Quinean metaontology, it is plausibly the most tractable way.4
To familiarize ourselves with the view, suppose there are two ways of
being—being-abstract and being-concrete. The pluralist can articulate this view by
claiming that the unrestricted quantifier we are all familiar with, ∃, which ranges over
both abstracta and concreta, is more naturally expressed as a disjunction of two
primitive quantifiers, ∃a , which only ranges over the abstracta, and ∃c , which only
2

See Turner (2010).
See McDaniel (2009, 2010, 2017) and Turner (2010).
4
My own preference is to work out ontological pluralism at the level of first-order properties, rather
than at the level of the quantifier. For the sake of the argument I aim to make here, nothing hangs on one
formulation over the other.
3
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ranges over the concreta.5 Given that we ought to prefer more natural expressions to
less natural expressions in our theorizing, the pluralist will therein deploy these
restricted quantifiers in her book of the world, and the supposedly less natural ∃ will
not figure. If in fact there is a way of being that all entities enjoy, that way is to be
defined up from the fundamental ways of being.
Once the ontological pluralist has the theoretical resources to distinguish between
modes of being, utility abounds. Given the difficult metaphysical challenge of what to
make of holes, Kris McDaniel puts this virtue of ontological pluralism as follows:6
The ontological pluralist can happily say that there are holes and then diligently
pursue the question of in what way there are holes. By contrast, according to the
ontological monist, either something is or it isn’t, and that’s all there is say about a
thing’s existential status. This puts the ontological monist in an uncomfortable
position. According to her, everything that there is enjoys the same kind of reality,
which is the kind of reality enjoyed by full-fledged concrete entities such as
ourselves. She is committed to the unpleasant claim that holes are just as real as
concretia, a claim that is apt to be met with incredulous stares by those not
acquainted with contemporary metaphysics.7

Once we have the resources to distinguish between kinds of reality, we can violate
fewer intuitions in our theorizing. Further, we can begin to see that worries about
5

The notion of naturalness at play here is from Sider (2013) where he notes that naturalness phenomena applies to grammatical categories beyond predicates. Further, the pluralist’s quantifiers, ∃a and ∃c ,
are primitive in the sense that they will not be further defined in terms of a more basic way of being.
6
As McDaniel acknowledges, this difficult challenge regarding almost nothings is captured well by
Sorensen (2008) who writes, “it feels paradoxical to say that absences exist—but no better to say that absences do not exist” and “...holes do not sit any more comfortably on the side of being than of nonbeing.”
7
See McDaniel (2017, §5.1).
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ontology bloating lose some bite when there are ways to bestow reality onto an entity
without being pressured to say those things are as real as you or me. More on this
latter point in §3.
3.2.2

Mereological Pluralism

Ontological pluralism aims to vindicate pretheoretic intuitions about the ontological
differences between, for example, the kind of reality that tables enjoy and the kind of
reality that numbers enjoy. Similarly, mereological pluralism aims to vindicate the
pretheoretic intuition that the sense in which a cat’s tail is a part of that cat is different
from the sense in which the letter ‘b’ is a part of the English alphabet, and also
different from the sense in which Socrates is a part of his singleton, {Socrates}.
Before articulating mereological pluralism more precisely, it’s important to flag a
methodological assumption here. One can of course stipulate outright that the proper
target of mereology is the sense of ‘part’ that corresponds with classical
mereology—and begin their theorizing from there. This is precarious. While it might
be fine for some purposes, if we hope to draw metaphysical conclusions from our
findings, mereology best track the intuitive notion of part, not some stipulated notion;
this is the intuitive notion according to which some things “make up” another. And
with respect to this intuitive notion, while it “may be subject to further clarification,
there remains a genuine question as to whether any reasonable clarification of it will
admit of different ways for one object to be a part of another.”8
8

See Fine (2010, p. 561.)
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Just as ontological pluralism can be characterized as the view that there are
fundamentally distinct existences, mereological pluralism is the view that there are
fundamentally distinct parthood relations. Critically, one is not a mereological pluralist
simply by endorsing the claim that there are spatial parts, functional parts, immediate
proper parts, etc., since these parthood relations might be analyzed in terms of a more
basic notion of part. Rather, one is a pluralist by endorsing the claim that there is a
plurality of fundamental, or basic parthood relations.
To familiarize ourselves with an example of this view, recall D. M. Armstrong’s
mereology according to which there are two ways to make wholes from parts—the
way in which a chair is made up of its seat (along with other things), and the way in
which states of affairs are made up of their constituents.9 On this view, while the seat is
a part of the chair, and Kris is a part of the state of affairs of Kris’s being hungry, the
seat and Kris are not parts in the same way.10 How are these relations differentiated?
Parthood in the former case obeys an unrestricted composition axiom according to
which for any xs, the xs compose some y; the latter parthood relation does not.11
While there are no doubt ways to endorse pluralism of both the ontological and
mereological varieties other than the two examples articulated above, for our purposes
here, this should suffice as an introduction to the views.12
9

See Armstrong (1986 and 1997).
See McDaniel (2009b) on the intelligibility of Armstrong’s “compositional pluralism”.
11
As pointed out in McDaniel (2009, p. 257), if this latter sort of parthood obeyed unrestricted composition then Armstrong’s states of affairs would fail to perform the task of distinguishing between worlds
in which the same entities exist (e.g. Kris and hunger) but some fact (e.g. Kris is hungry) obtains in one
world but not the other.
12
See Caplan (2011) for more on the differing ways one can be an ontological pluralist. For more on
mereological pluralism, see McDaniel (2009), Fine (1994, 1999), Grossman (1973), and Simons (1987).
10
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3.3

F ITTINGNESS

Why think that ontological and mereological pluralism make a good package? Here
are three reasons. First, proponents of the views share a methodological strategy
regarding intuitions in our theorizing. Second, the ontological pluralist’s
metaontological programme does not undermine the intuitive cases which motivate
mereological pluralism. Third, some of the putatively undesirable consequences of
mereological pluralism will be untroubling for the ontological pluralist.

3.3.1

Methodological Kin

In the articulation of both examples of ontological and mereological pluralism above, I
briefly addressed a background motivation for the views—to vindicate pretheoretic
intuitions. Intuitively, the sense in which I exist differs from the sense in which
numbers exist. This is captured by the pluralist’s view that there are distinct modes of
existence. Intuitively, the sense in which my seat’s cushion is a part of my seat differs
from the sense in which the letter ‘b’ is a part of the English alphabet. This is captured
by the pluralist’s view that there are distinct parthoods. Both pluralists share a clear
methodological strategy. This methodological kinship centers on intuitions in our
metaphysical theorizing.
Clearly specifying where the above agreement lies is tricky. One likely aspect of the
agreement is as follows. Both pluralists agree that intuitions are the philosophers’ data.
Violating intuitions will no doubt happen since we often have conflicting intuitions,
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but it is costly and should be avoided when possible. Further, when we intuit polysemy,
going pluralist in the metaphysics is a more perspicuous way to vindicate those
intuitions, all things being equal. Thus, insofar as one finds ‘exists’ and ‘part’ to be
intuitively polysemous, the rationale which leads her to ontological pluralism should
also lead her to mereological pluralism (and vice versa).
If that’s right, then we can more explicitly state at least some of the background
agreement as follows. First, theories can differ in their choiceworthiness because of the
expressions they deploy—the more natural the expressions, the better. Second,
intuitively polysemous expressions which denote properties are prima facie most
perspicuously captured by endorsing pluralism regarding those properties.
Discovering that both the ontological and mereological pluralist endorse these
claims is important. Given how controversial these claims are in metaphysics more
generally, it shows that the kinship between the two views is surprisingly deep. After
all, both claims are controversial enough to rule out some popular views. For example,
the first point will likely be opposed by neo-Carnapians who reject the notion of
naturalness (insofar as it is meant to be a joint-carving notion).13 And the second point
will at least be at odds with those who think that even if intuitions offer some
theoretical guidance, this guidance is easily overridden by other considerations, such
as parsimony.14
13

Hirsch’s quantifier variance (2011) and Thomasson’s easy ontology (2007, 2014), for example, are
very different, but nevertheless in many important cases, they both exemplify the broadly Carnapian view
that many familiar metaphysical worries are ultimately grounded in linguistic confusion. The supposed
tension between metaphysical views according to which there are tables and those according to which
there are only simples arranged tablewise, for example, is to be deflated in one way or another. In these
cases, the world “has no preference” regarding which expressions we ought to use to write our theory.
14
Neo-Quineans who prefer the desert landscape, for example, will almost certainly have a stronger

45

3.3.2

Metaontological Amenability

Second, ontological pluralism and mereological pluralism make a good pair because
the former provides a metaphysical backdrop that is amenable to the intuitive cases
which motivate the latter. To see this, it is helpful to begin with the different ways in
which the mereological pluralist might individuate her parthood relations.
In the brief introduction to mereological pluralism in §2.2, we saw that one way to
distinguish between parthood relations is by noting differences in the axioms which
govern those relations; Armstrong has one parthood relation which obeys an
unrestricted composition axiom, and one parthood relation which does not.
Analogously, if we intuit that tables and sets have ‘parts’ in different senses, then the
pluralist may want to claim these senses track fundamentally distinct parthood
relations by appeal to the distinct laws that govern the parthood of tables in contrast
with the parthood of sets. Unlike classical parthood, set membership is intransitive.15
Another way to distinguish between the pluralist’s parthood relations is to assert
that the relations apply to different categories.16 Intuitively, the sense in which my
chair has its seat as a part is distinct from the sense in which the English alphabet has
the letter (type) ‘b’ as a part. The difference we intuit here seems intimately bound up
with the fact that tables and letter types are entities of very different kinds. More
conviction to avoid positing a plurality of primitive notions in order to vindicate some intuition, particularly if they can make true all the “right claims.” Insofar as they recognize that pluralism might do a
better job than monism in handling some intuitive phenomena, they might still say, so much the worse
for those intuitions.
15
Shieva is a member of her singleton, {Shieva}, which is a member of its singleton, {{Shieva}}, but
Shieva is not a member of {{Shieva}}, since {{Shieva}} has only one member, {Shieva}, which is not
identical to Shieva.
16
See McDaniel (2004, 2009b).
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generally, the larger the ontological chasm between the kinds, the smaller the surprise
if objects in those categories participate in fundamentally different kinds of relations.
Once we get on board with the spirit of the pluralist approach, it’s difficult to see why
we should suppose that the way in which concreta make things up is identical to the
way in which abstracta make things up in the first place.
Yet another way to distinguish relations is by logical form. According to McDaniel
(2004), the fundamental parthood relation material objects stand in is 3-placed, while
the fundamental parthood relation that spacetime regions stand in is 2-placed.17 The
logical form of the former is, x is a part of y at region R, while the form of the latter is x
is a part of y.
So there are a host of ways for the mereological pluralist to individuate her
relations. And many of the cases that illustrate these ways have intuitive pull in favor
of mereological pluralism. These cases, however, make use of many different kinds of
entities. The axiomatic-difference case appeals to sets. The category-difference case
appeals to letters, and logical-difference case appeals to spacetime regions.
Importantly, the existence of these entities is not without controversy. Consider the
popular neo-Quinean metaontological programme. Essential to a version of it is the
penchant for desert landscapes. For the metaphysician who is committed to this sort of
ontological simplicity, it would be unsurprising if her book of the world ultimately
included only, say, properties and spacetime.18 And if one rejects the existence of such
entities altogether, there are no motivating cases for mereological pluralism to be
17
18

See McDaniel (2004).
For examples of ontological simplicity in action, see Lewis (1986) and Ted Sider (2013).
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had.19
On the other hand, consider the ontological pluralist’s ontology. It is likely to be
brimming with all sorts of entities. She might think there are past objects, future
objects, fictional objects, merely possible objects, and perhaps even impossible objects.
By her lights, not all of these things exist in the same way; and some perhaps don’t
exist in any way (which is the case on some Meinongian versions of ontological
pluralism). Importantly, there are such things. Thus, there is no such tension between
the pluralist’s metaontology and the cases which motivate mereological pluralism.

3.3.3

Potential Costs

Third, endorsing both versions of pluralism allows one to sidestep some putative
problems for mereological pluralism held independently. Mereological pluralism
appears to have a number of controversial implications. With the right background
commitments, some of these implications will be found unwelcome, and therein
generate an independent case for denying mereological pluralism. Here are two such
examples.
First, mereological pluralism seems to lead to ontology bloating. Suppose there are
exactly two basic parthood relations that both obey unrestricted composition, but are
differentiated by, say, logical form. Then, whenever some things compose at all, we
end up with two wholes—one for each parthood relation. Indeed, the more ways of
19

It doesn’t follow from this that the neo-Quinean of this sort cannot endorse mereological pluralism;
it only follows that they do not have the option of appealing to these cases to get the view off the ground.
Perhaps they might claim that the theoretical utility is independently sufficient for endorsing the view.
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building wholes we endorse, the more we proliferate kinds of wholes. In this way, we
end up with far more things in our ontology than we might have hoped for. This is an
unparsimonious consequence, and so we ought to reject mereological pluralism, or so
the thought goes.
As we have already seen, however, the ontological pluralist is not so worried about
ontology bloating. She has ways of bestowing reality onto objects with minimal
ontological cost (e.g. by granting them diminished existence or, following the
Meinongian, no existence). Thus, what might be an unwelcome cost for mereological
pluralism turns out to be untroubling for the ontological pluralist.
Second, mereological pluralism also seems to naturally lead to the possibility of
colocation for material objects. If there are different ways in which some material xx
might compose, then it might happen that the xx compose some y in one way and
some z in another way, where y ∕= z. Now, given the deeply intuitive claim that wholes
are located just where their parts are located, it follows that y and z will be
colocated.20 And if wholes are guaranteed to be material if all of their parts are
material, then such cases will be cases of material colocation. Alas, if the colocation of
material objects is impossible, then so much the worse for mereological pluralism.
Again, the ontological pluralist will be unworried. She is amenable to entities such
as shadows and absences. By the lights of the ontological pluralist, these
20

This principle is sometimes called “mereological harmony,” following Schaffer (2009) and Uzquiano
(2011). For more on harmony, see Leonard (2016). Also note that any mereological pluralist who rejects
harmony will be unmoved by this objection; this is the case for McDaniel (2009b) who argues that
harmony fails at least for the parthood relation enjoyed by structured universals. Importantly, however,
there are many “harmonious” versions of mereological pluralism to be entertained—and proponents of
these versions will have to contend with the objection.
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almost-nothings are real. Not only can these entities be counted, but it is deeply
intuitive that they are spatiotemporally located and even enter into causal relations.21
Further, their locations can no doubt overlap with the locations of other material
objects. For example, plausibly, the absence of water in my glass might be exactly
co-located with the coffee in my glass; and my shadow might be exactly co-located
with some arrangement of simples on the pavement. Thus, material colocation is not
worrisome for the ontological pluralist, and will therein be found impotent as a case
against those who endorse both ontological and mereological pluralism (in contrast to
mereological pluralism alone).
Ultimately, I take it these three reasons tell in favor of a deep fit between
ontological and mereological pluralism. No doubt some other metaontological
programmes might fit with mereological pluralism along some dimensions, but it is
doubtful they will fit as neatly as ontological pluralism.

3.4

E XTENSIONALITY

Strictly speaking, the case for fittingness above gives more reason for the mereological
pluralist to be an ontological pluralist than the other way around. To further explore
what can be said in the latter direction, we ought first consider how mereological
pluralism bears on extensional mereology. Finally, we will derive some mereological
principles at the pluralist’s disposal.
Orthodoxy suggests that if some x and some y share exactly the same parts, then x
21

For more on absences, see Sartorio (2016), Bernstein (2015), and Schaffer (2000, 2004).
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and y are identical. This rests on the very strong intuition that can be sloganized as
follows: no difference without a difference maker. Call this intuition, No Difference. But
on the considered view, since there are different ways to mereologically make a whole,
it is possible for one plurality to make two (or more) things. Does mereological
pluralism therein entail a violation of the strong intuition? It’s not so clear. Consider
the following principle:
E XTENSIONALITY If x and y are composite objects with the same parts, then x = y.
When the mereological pluralist sees ‘parts’ in the aforementioned principle, she will
note the ambiguity. On one reading, it uses ‘parts’ to denote some generic,
non-fundamental kind of parthood. This is quite a natural reading as it seems to track
the intuitive sense of ‘part’ in which some things make up another. Read this way, it is
incompatible with mereological pluralism—ex hypothesi, there are multiple ways to
make wholes from the very same parts. This may seem like a costly, counterintuitive
result.
In response, the pluralist will note that she sees the following alternative readings,
where ‘partsn ’ is to be read as a placeholder for any particular, basic, parthood relation.
E XTENSIONALITY * If x and y are composite objects with the same partsn , then x = y.
The point here is that while the mereological pluralist is committed to rejecting some
notion of extensionality, she needn’t reject extensionality for any of her basic parthood
relations. Given that all of the pluralist’s fundamental parthood relations can
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themselves be extensional, she can reasonably insist that there is no serious violation
of No Difference.22
Noting that Extensionality and Extensionality* come apart in this way is instructive.
What it shows is that the mereological pluralist can capture the strong No Difference
intuition while still making logical space for possibilities such as the following:

a1
b1

a2
b2

b3

The above model, M, represents cases where two distinct entities, a1 and a2 , share
exactly the same parts, b1 , b2 , and b3 . While a1 and a2 are wholes in different ways,
they are both mereological wholes nonetheless. As such, extensional mereologists
must insist that M represents an impossibility. In contrast, the mereological pluralist
rejects Extensionality; Extensionality* does just fine in respecting No Difference and
generates no pressure to reject M-cases. The mereological pluralist therein takes no
issue with the possibility of two distinct entities sharing exactly the same parts (so long
as the wholes stand in distinct composition relations to their parts). As we will see, the
ability to distinguish between entities which share exactly the same parts is
tremendously serviceable.
22

No doubt the mereological pluralist might ultimately want to give up even Extensionality*. My primary contention here is that a serious violation of No Difference is not a feature of mereological pluralism
as such.
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3.5

P LURALISM

AT

W ORK

While the implications of mereological pluralism are far reaching, here I aim only to
point out two puzzles mereological pluralism has the resources to resolve. Insofar as
mereological pluralism generates interesting solutions to extant philosophical puzzles,
so much the better for the package of ontological and mereological pluralism.
The first puzzle has to do with propositions. Propositions are strange. We might
have strong views about their role in our theorizing, but determining what they are
like has proved quite challenging. Matti Eklund discusses the problem of the unity of
the proposition, which he takes to be best understood as a handful of related problems
which sometimes fall under the classification of Bradley’s regress.23 One of these
difficult challenges is to distinguish propositions from facts.
D IFFERENCE Why isn’t the proposition that P identical to the fact that P?
Given a view on which propositions are made up of worldly constituents, just like
facts, then the proposition that P and the fact that P will have exactly the same parts.
So there is pressure to identify the two. But this cannot be, since the existence of the
proposition that P does not guarantee the truth of P, while the existence of the fact that
P does. Notice, though, that the force of the challenge comes from a background
endorsement of Extensionality. If we, like the mereological pluralist, allow for M-cases,
then D IFFERENCE is impotent. This is because we can suppose that propositions are just
like facts in that they are mereologically complex entities, made from the same parts,
23

See Eklund (2016).
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but nevertheless distinct, as propositions are composed in one way, and facts in
another.
Similarly, the mereological pluralist will have a solution to the problem of material
constitution. To briefly rehearse one iteration of the puzzle, following Gibbard (1975),
suppose that a sculptor intends to make a clay statue of Goliath. He does so by
sculpting the top half out of some clay, and then the bottom half out of some more clay.
Finally, he combines the two halves, thereby creating a new lump of clay and a new
statue. What are we to say about the relationship between the resulting lump and
statue? While Gibbard’s original argument aims to establish contingent identities, the
story nicely motivates the more general puzzle.
This more general puzzle appears to arise whenever two conditions are met: (i)
there is reason to think that some x and some y are identical; (ii) there is reason to
think the x and y are distinct. Condition (ii) is typically satisfied through the story by
appeal to differing persistence conditions. In the case at hand, only Lumpl can survive
being smashed. Critically, (i) is typically satisfied through the story by appeal to
sameness of parts. In this case, we are meant to think that Lumpl and Goliath are
identical because they are both made up of the same things. Again, since sameness of
parts does not guarantee sameness of wholes for the mereological pluralist, she will
find condition (i) unsatisfied and therein the general problem of material constitution
will not plague her.24
24

At least, if there is yet an extant problem of material constitution, the cases must be radically different
so as to not appeal to sameness of parts to meet condition (i). There are, of course, related puzzles such
as the Grounding Problem, which I have set aside here because extensionality failure alone will not be
enough to block the puzzles from arising.

54

There is more to explore here, but we have done enough to learn some important
lessons. There is a deep fittingness between ontological pluralism and mereological
pluralism such that proponents of the latter have strong reason to endorse the former.
Further, mereological pluralists can reject extensional mereology without violating the
intuition which motivates it. From this we learned that mereological pluralism has the
resources to resolve some perennial metaphysical problems; insofar as the ontological
pluralist endorses mereological pluralism, she will inherit this utility. Thus, the
impressive catalog of things ontological pluralism can do for us grows ever longer.
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4

MOP and the Growing Block

4.1

I NTRODUCTION

Given the recent interest in non-Quinean metaontologies, it is unsurprising that many
philosophers are exploring the utility of these heterodox views by revisiting familiar
metaphysical debates. In this paper, I aim to join in this project by considering what
more can be said about time from a Meinongian perspective. The simplest way to
articulate the view I have in mind is by contrast with a similar rival.
Kris McDaniel has recently developed a view of time he calls, Presentist Existential
Pluralism (PEP), which makes use of the resources of ontological pluralism.1 McDaniel
contends that PEP is intuitive, theoretically useful, and doesn’t suffer from serious
troubles of its own; insofar as it is better at satisfying this criteria than alternative
views, PEP is worthy of belief.2 Along the way, McDaniel argues that PEP is preferable
to a nearby rival, Meinongian Presentism (MP).
My aim here is not to make trouble for McDaniel’s argument for PEP over MP.
1

McDaniel (2017, §3).
Plausibly, consonance with the empirical sciences is critically important. Following McDaniel, I am
bracketing this criterion. Whether or not views according to which the present is metaphysically privileged is consonant with our best physical theories is too large a question to address here.
2
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Rather, I argue that there is a better, third option, one which makes use of both
Meinongian and ontological pluralist resources. I call this view the Meinongian
Growing Block Theory and contend that it overtakes PEP as the best contender. My
plan for this is as follows: In §2, I present PEP and rehearse McDaniel’s reasons for its
superiority over MP. In §3, I articulate my view and argue that it is superior to PEP.3 In

§4, I consider how the view fairs against Ross Cameron’s new Moving Spotlight Theory
and Brad Skow’s Quasi-Fragmentalism.

4.2

P LURALIST P RESENTISM

VS .

M EINONGIAN P RESENTISM

One way to ensure the substance of the debate between the orthodox views of time is
to suppose that there is one metaphysically fundamental meaning for the quantifier, ‘∃’,
that the presentist, eternalist, and growing block theorist all deploy. We can then
define the competing views as follows.
P RESENTISM: the view that ¬∃x(x is a past or future object) is true.
E TERNALISM: the view that each of the following is true: ∃x(x is a past object),

∃x(x is a present object), and ∃x(x is a future object).
G ROWING B LOCK T HEORY: the view that each of the following is true: ∃x(x is a
past object), ∃x(x is a present object), and ¬∃x(x is a future object).
This way of framing the debate typically presupposes ontological monism, the view
3
It should be made explicit that McDaniel’s ultimate goal with PEP is to demonstrate the philosophical
fruit of ontological pluralism more generally. Because the view I defend here is a pluralist one, if anything,
my arguments here only add more fruit to the ontological pluralist tree.
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that there is only one way of being, which is represented by the quantifier, ‘∃’. This
presupposition leads us to think that the above three views are the only legitimately
viable options.4
In opposition, Kris McDaniel endorses ontological pluralism, the view that there are
ways or modes of being. The theory is often said to capture the intuitive view that
what we mean when we say that tables exist is something other than what we mean
when we say numbers exist.5 Recent proponents of ontological pluralism have
formulated the doctrine by invoking a plurality of semantically primitive, restricted
quantifiers;6 or by invoking a plurality of metaphysically fundamental meanings
available for the unrestricted ‘∃’.
PEP: There are two metaphysically fundamental (possible) meanings for the
unrestricted quantifier, ‘∃’; ‘∃p x’, which ranges over all and only past objects,
and ‘∃c x’, which ranges over all and only present objects; there is no
fundamental quantifier that ranges over objects in both domains.
On PEP, there are two fundamentally distinct kinds of existence: present-existence and
past-existence.7 Pluralism allows us to take seriously the notion that the past is real,
but not as real as the present. The resulting view is striking. Like Presentism, PEP
vindicates the intuition that the present is metaphysically privileged. And yet, like
4

Of course, there is logical space for other views, but few take those options seriously.
Turner (2010).
6
McDaniel (2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2017) and Turner (2010). There are other ways of formulating
pluralism, but given the popularity of the neo-Quinean metaontology, it is plausibly the most tractable
way.
7
For the time being, we will bracket talk of the future.
5
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Eternalism, PEP avoids the well known truth-maker objection to Presentism.8 PEP
therein has the best of both worlds.
A similar view, Meinongian Presentism (MP), appears to accomplish just as much.
Because Meinongians sever the connection between existence and quantification, they
have the resources to articulate the following view. Only present things exist; and,
while past things do not exist, there are past things.9 This view seems to have similar
virtues as PEP. There are both past and present objects, but the present is still
metaphysically privileged, as past objects do not exist. Further, since there are past
objects, there is no serious trouble with truth-maker objections.
Still, McDaniel claims PEP is preferable to MP. The first reason for this is that PEP
needn’t deal with non-existents. According to McDaniel’s ontological pluralism,
everything there is exists in some way or other. Insofar as nonexistent entities are
independently implausible, so much the worse for Meinongianism. The second reason
is that MP appears to ontologically group past entities like dinosaurs with mythical
entities like elves; both kinds of entities are simply nonexistents. Lumping dinosaurs
and elves together in this way fails to respect the ontological facts. Fair enough.
In the following section, I present another Meinongian theory of time and show
that it can do what PEP can do (and more) while at the same time avoiding the
aforementioned criticism of MP.
8
9

See Sider (2001), Armstrong (2004), Keller (2004), Crisp (2007).
Gallois (2004), Hinchliff (1988), and Yourgrau (1993).
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4.3

M EINONGIAN G ROWING B LOCK T HEORY

4.3.1

A Meta-Ontology

McDaniel has pit Meinongianism and ontological pluralism against one another. But
it’s important to note that these metaontologies are compatible.10 You might, for
instance, endorse the following characteristic theses of Meinongianism:
1. Existence is a first-order property.
2. There are entities that lack existence.
3. There are two different ways for objects to have properties.
The first thesis says that existence is a property of individuals. Something has existence
in the same way that it might have roundness—by exemplification. We are not to
understand existence as a second-order property, represented with a quantifier. The
second thesis is a statement of Noneism, which says that there are nonexistent objects.
Some entities fail to exemplify existence. The sense in which there are such things
must be understood by appeal to Neutral Quantification.11 The third thesis says that in
addition to exemplification, objects can encode properties. Unlike exemplification,
encoding is not existence-entailing.12
10

This should be somewhat unsurprising, since Meinong himself endorsed a sort of ontological pluralism in distinguishing between existence and subsistence.
11
On Neutral Quantification, there is a pair of quantifiers, general and particular, which range over
both existent and non-existent entities. Loaded quantification is defined up with an existence predicate,
E!.
12
From the fact that I exemplify the property of being seated, it follows that I exist; from the fact that
Sherlock Holmes encodes the property of being a detective, it does not follow that he exists.
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There is no inconsistency in further endorsing ontological pluralism. To do this, we
can specify that existence is best thought of as a plurality of fundamental existence
properties rather than a single one. On this view, existence can be thought of as a
family of fundamental, analogous properties.13 For an object to exist in a generic
sense, then, is for it to have at least one fundamental existence property. For our
purposes here, simple changes to (1) and (2) will suffice for characterizing
Meinongian Ontological Pluralism (MOP):
4. Existence is a plurality of first-order properties.
5. There are entities that lack all existence properties.
6. There are two different ways for objects to have properties.

4.3.2

An Analogy Between Modality and Time

What might a proponent of MOP say about time? The view I have in mind can be
understood as the temporal analog of the following modal metaphysic. Take Lewis’s
modal realism, but reject actuality as indexical; instead, take actuality and mere
possibility as ways of being.14 There is the actual world, which enjoys actual-existence;
the merely possible worlds, which enjoy possible-existence; and the impossible worlds,
which don’t exist at all. Both actual and merely possible entities exist in some way or
other and therein exemplify the properties they have. Impossible entities are unreal,
and therein are said to encode the properties they have. This latter, distinctively
13

In order to qualify as a genuine pluralist view, the various existence properties must be basic—they
must not be further analyzed in terms of a more basic notion of existence.
14
See Bricker (2006).
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Meinongian move, helps to ground truths about impossible things, while preserving
the intuition that impossible things do not exist in any way.15
The analogy to time is straightforward. There are the present entities, which enjoy
present-existence; the past entities, which enjoy past-existence; and future entities,
which dont exist at all. Both present and past entities exist in some way or other, and
therein exemplify the properties they have. Future entities are unreal, and therein
encode the properties they have. This latter move helps ground truths about the future
without jeopardizing the intuition that the future is entirely nonexistent. On this view,
the future is unreal, while the past and the present make up a four-dimensional
manifold of concrete existents. Further, this manifold grows as time passes—hence,
Meinongian Growing Block Theory, or MGB.16
The above analogy suggests a deep metaphysical connection between the future
and the impossible—one that some might find surprising. I think this upshot is actually
a welcome one. Not only do we have strong intuitions about the unreality of both the
future and the impossible, but there are also more substantive reasons for admitting
the analogy. Paradigmatic impossible objects are inconsistent ones—objects that have
some property, F, and some property, G, where F and G are incompatible (e.g.
roundness and squareness). In a way, these impossible objects have too many
properties to be real. Additionally, our intuitions about the unreality of the future
15

This appeal to impossibilia is not unmotivated. There are well known reasons for thinking that
our metaphysics would be better off countenancing impossible worlds. We may need them to model
intentional states (Jago 2009, 2014), or explain the putative truths of inconsistent fictions (Priest 1997;
Berto 2012), or analyze counterpossible reasoning (Nolan 1997), etc.
16
For more classical formulations of the growing block view, see Broad (1923) and Tooley (1997).
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appear to be linked to our intuition that the future is open—that facts about the future
have yet to be settled. One way of making sense of an open future is to suggest that
there is some kind of indeterminacy regarding future property instantiations. That is,
the future is partly constituted by incomplete objects, where for some property, F, the
future object in question has neither F nor not-F. On such a view, these future objects
have too few properties to be real. Thus, there is good reason for thinking that there is
an intimate, metaphysical link between the future and the impossible because,
plausibly, both sorts of entities deviate from the level of determinacy required for
reality.17

4.3.3

A-Theoretic Commitments

Unsurprisingly, MGB has a-theoretic commitments. After all, the inception of the
project was partly guided by the desire to vindicate the intuition that the present is
metaphysically special. That said, there are different ways to characterize what makes
for an a-theory as opposed to a b-theory, none of which are entirely uncontroversial. I
will not settle on a particular way of framing that debate here, but it is nevertheless
informative to note what MGB may or may not be committed to. Here, I will consider
four theses often associated with the a-theory, take two of them on board, and hope to
remain neutral about the other two.
P RIVILEGED P RESENT: There is a unique objectively privileged present: the time
which is present. No description of reality can be correct without specifying
17

Something in the neighborhood seems implied but not explicitly stated in McDaniel (2010a, p. 709)
regarding mere intentionalia (i.e. objects of possible thought).
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which time is present.18
T EMPORARY P RESENTNESS : What time is objectively privileged changes: the time
that is objectively present either was or will not be present (or both), and some
time that is not objectively present either was or will be (or both).19
I take MGB to be committed to P RIVILEGED P RESENT. It is constitutive of MGB that the
present is privileged, since the view essentially claims that being present is a
fundamental existence property. Further, a book of the world that fails to say what
exists (and in what ways) surely fails to offer a complete description of reality. I also
take it to be committed to T EMPORARY P RESENTNESS. Without the stipulation that the
time that is present changes, we run the risk of ultimately not having a growing block
at all. If all we are left with in the end is a static, four-dimensional, concrete manifold,
then even if one subregion of it has a special ontological status, we could hardly claim
to have vindicated the intuitions which motivate Presentism to begin with.
Of course, it is controversial to characterize the a-theory with P RIVILEGED P RESENT
and T EMPORARY P RESENTNESS. This is due in large part to the fact that, as stated, they
quantify over times.20 Those who are averse to this might instead prefer to
characterize the a-theory as a view about the fundamentality (or primitivity) and
indispensability of tense operators:
F UNDAMENTAL TENSE : There is a fundamental distinction between the present
18

See Cameron (2015, p. 2).
See Cameron (2015, p. 2).
20
I myself don’t find this particularly worrisome. Because there is a four-dimensional spacetime on
MGB, quantifying over times is not troublesome in the way that it might be for a Presentist.
19
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and other times, and expressing this distinction requires primitive tense
operators.21
Still others might think it is best to focus on the nature of change:
A-P ROPERTY C HANGE : Objects do not require temporal parts or time-relational
properties to undergo change. Some objects have temporary non-relational
properties and endure through change.22
Ultimately, I think that these latter principles are preferable to the former two in
demarcating the boundaries of the a-theory. This is because they are more
metaphysically perspicuous. Still, to the extent that it is possible, I would like to stay
neutral about them. There are two reasons for this.
First, along with the perspicuousness, the principles also come with more
theoretical baggage. P RIVILEGED P RESENT and T EMPORARY P RESENTNESS are simply
precise statements of deep intuitions about the nature of the present. It would take
little work to get a layman to nod along with these principles. On the other hand,
F UNDAMENTAL T ENSE and A-P ROPERTY C HANGE make reference to more technical
notions—tense operators, temporal parts, time-relational properties, endurance, etc.
The layman will likely have much weaker convictions about these latter principles,
assuming they have any at all. Before nodding along with F UNDAMENTAL T ENSE and
A-P ROPERTY C HANGE, they would require, among other things, an understanding of
21

This formulation of the principle is from Sullivan (2012). See Zimmerman (1998) for clarity about
what it means to take tense seriously in this way.
22
See Sullivan (2012).
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some formal language and its relationship to the programme of ontology. The more
theory-laden these principles become, the more we run the risk of deviating from our
original, target phenomena.
Second, apart from incurring the risk of missing the target phenomena, my aim in
this project is to develop and defend a Meinongian theory of time that is worth our
philosophical attention. In arguing for MGB, doing with fewer contentious
commitments means the view will have wider appeal. I might ultimately think that
proponents of MGB should endorse F UNDAMENTAL T ENSE or A-P ROPERTY C HANGE, but
that is to be settled dialectically downstream. The arguments I present here in favor of
MGB over its competitors will not presume a prior commitment to (or rejection of)
these latter, a-theoretic principles.23

4.3.4

The Scoreboard at Half-Time

By my count, MGB is doing quite well. Just like PEP and MP, it captures a privileged
present and sidesteps the truth-maker objection to Presentism. So MGB also looks to
be the best of both worlds. It is unsurprising that MGB also satisfies this desideratum
since, just like PEP, it uses ontological pluralism to distinguish between present and
past. Importantly, because MGB distinguishes between present-existence and
past-existence, in contrast to MP, the view does not mistakenly categorize dinosaurs
with elves. So, McDaniel’s first complaint for MP will not apply to MGB.
23

As I have already stated, I don’t take myself to be giving substantive reasons for preferring one way
of demarcating a-theory from b-theory. Rather, I take myself to have given reasons for only committing
to some a-theoretic principles for the sake of formulating a generic version of MGB and arguing for its
relative merits.
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What should we say about the second complaint? MGB does trade in non-existent
entities. Presumably this is a cost for MGB—a reason to prefer PEP. This is too quick.
There is a lot to say in response depending case by case on the rationale one gives for
their aversion towards non-existents. Here I’ll briefly address three likely rationales.
Rationale 1: Non-existents are pretheoretically spooky, and so intuitively
objectionable. That is, entertaining the concept of a non-existent might make us feel
the same way as when we entertain, for example, bare particulars, or divine simplicity,
or genuine absence causation, or some other concept that one might find initially
opaque. If so, we have prima facie reason to do without non-existents; better to stick to
deploying well-understood concepts. Perhaps one can make non-existence tractable by
doing some philosophy, just as some have made bare particulars and divine simplicity
tractable, but success here does not mitigate the fact that these concepts are initially
opaque. The thought here is that this is enough to justify a defeasible prejudice against
non-existents.
I do not grant that non-existent entities are intuitively objectionable, or that there is
anything pre-theoretically odd about non-existents.24 Whether or not we accept them
into our metaphysical theories is a separate issue, and it is to be settled later on with a
theoretical cost-benefit analysis.25 In ordinary language, quantification over
non-existents is commonplace and straightforward. This is entirely dissimilar to a
constituent ontologist’s theory of individuation or the mereological structure of God on
24

That is, I cannot find any oddness that would justify even a prima facie prejudice against nonexistents.
25
Before we settle on whether to accept or reject non-existents, we must first explore what they might
be able to do for us. See Lewis (1986) on the serviceability of genuine modal realism.
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classical theism, neither of which are parts of ordinary discourse at all. I don’t think
that ordinary language has an authoritative role in our ontological theorizing, but it
certainly plays some role. Insofar as we hope to identify pre-theoretic intuitions for and
against non-existents, ordinary language will be tremendously informative.26
Rationale 2: Talk of non-existents is metaphysical nonsense. Here one might appeal
to the putative link between quantifier phrases such as ‘there are’ and existence
predicates, insisting that to say ‘there are Fs’ is just to say ‘Fs exist’. If there is a deep
connection here in the way the neo-Quineans claim, then it could never be true that
there are non-existent entities.27
This gets the cart before the horse. Those who insist that non-existent entities are a
nonstarter come to the table with background meta-ontological commitments. It is
question-begging to object to a Meinongian theory of time by presupposing
neo-Quineanism; the proponent of MGB antecedently rejects neo-Quineanism. Further,
the meta-ontological views we ultimately endorse partly depend on just how
serviceable those views ultimately are, and the utility of Meinongianism is precisely
what we are exploring here. Thus, to rule Meinongianism out from the start is
methodologically mistaken.
Rationale 3: Considerations of parsimony count against non-existents. McDaniel is
not a neo-Quinean, nor would he likely think non-existents are particularly odd given
26

Additionally, even if I were to grant the spookiness charge, I take the theoretical utility of nonexistents to be well worth the cost. I soon present this utility in addressing the third rationale against
non-existents.
27
By ‘neo-Quinean’, I mean to denote the view according to which there is a single, fundamental sense
of ‘exists’ and it is to be captured with the existential quantifier. See van Inwagen (1998).
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his exploration of so-called “almost nothings.”28 He might nevertheless reject
non-existents on the grounds that they are unnecessary. If we can accomplish all the
work with just ontological pluralism, introducing Meinongian machinery is all cost, no
benefit. That much seems right.
I say the juice is worth the squeeze. In formulating MGB, I glossed over the idea
that it is amenable to our intuitions about the future—namely that the future is unreal,
and there are at least some truths about it. I noted that Meinongianism allows us to
quantify over future non-existents and to attribute properties to those entities by
extending what Meinongians have said about the modal onto the temporal. This
allows us to make sense of future truth without jeopardizing the unreality of the
future. PEP is unable to accomplish this—and as a matter of principle, no less. On PEP,
everything there is exists in some way or other. It can no doubt be extended to capture
future truths by introducing future-existence in addition to past- and present-existence,
but doing so would inevitably and problematically reify the future. Without the
resources of Meinongianism, we are compelled to betray at least one deep intuition
about the future.
By my lights, this makes MGB the tentative front-runner given the rubric we began
with. MGB is more intuitive than PEP when we consider all of our intuitions about
time, and it has more theoretical utility since it has Meinongian resources in addition
to the resources of ontological pluralism.29
28

1.

See McDaniel (2010b). At least not odd in the pretheoretically opaque way characterized by Rationale

29

I say ‘tentative’ because here I have not explicitly taken on the project of showing that Meinongian
Ontological Pluralism does not have serious troubles of its own.
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4.4

M OVING S POTLIGHT T HEORY

AND

F RAGMENTALISM

In this section, I briefly explore how MGB stacks up against some more distant
competitors.30 A critique of all of MGB’s competitors is no doubt untenable here; even
a thorough critique of just a few competitors would make this project too unwieldy. My
aim here is simply to gesture at how I think some of this will go. To this end, I
highlight two recently developed theories of time—Ross Cameron’s Moving Spotlight
Theory (CST) and Bradford Skow’s Quasi-Fragmentalism (QF)—and offer some
cursory answers to a few important questions.31 Do the virtues of MGB illuminated in

§2 and §3 still count in favor of the view when contrasted with more distant theories of
time? Are those views serviceable in ways that MGB is not? If so, can they be
serviceable without suffering problems of their own?
Let’s dispense with the first question quickly by noting that, as will become clear,
CST and QF fail to respect our intuitions about the unreal future, much like PEP.
Insofar as these views endorse future entities without having a mechanism for
countenancing genuine non-existents, they reify the future and therein betray our
intuitions. I count this a serious cost. We cannot cherrypick which intuitions about
time we take to offer guidance and which to ignore. Taking intuitions seriously does
30

In the previous section, I argued that the Meinongian Growing Block Theory is preferable to its nearby
rivals, PEP and MP. I take the nearby views just to be the ones that are in some sense built from a rejection
of neo-Quinean orthodoxy; the distant ones are the non-nearby ones.
31
A quick word about the naming convention here. The term ‘Quasi-Fragmentalism’ is not meant to
sound pejorative. Skow’s (2015) use of Minkowski geometry to capture what he calls the Passage Intuition makes the resulting view bear a deep resemblance to the Fragmentalism of Fine (2005). ‘Quasi’
seems apt insofar as Fragmentalism is essentially characterized as explicitly deploying sentential operators to capture a fundamental distinction between what is the case and what is the case in reality. The
view is not one Skow himself endorses, but one he develops on behalf of his competitors.
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not mean we ought never give them up, but it does mean that doing so is costly.

4.4.1

Cameron’s Moving Spotlight Theory

Here’s a sketch of CST. According to standard spotlight theory, everything exists
eternally in the regions of a four-dimensional, spacetime manifold. Objects perdure,
and (only) presentness a-theoretically “moves across” the manifold. Cameron agrees
with the first claim—that past, present, and future things exist and have
four-dimensional locations—but disagrees with the rest.32 Objects endure, and rather
than introducing a metaphorical, moving spotlight to explain the passage of time, the
world itself ages intrinsically. Here, objects are said to age without any changes in
concreteness, spatiotemporal location, distributional properties, and essential
properties. Further, objects have temporal distributional properties, intrinsic properties
that describe every way the object was, is, or will be at every given age. For example, I
have the distributional property of being, at age n, such that I was standing, am now
seated, and will be eating soon, etc... My entire history is packed into these properties.
These temporal distributional properties, together with the intrinsic age properties,
serve as the truth-makers for all of the temporal facts.
Why endorse CST? Beyond the fact that it accounts for the privileged present
without inviting the truth-maker objection—no small feat—here are two reasons. The
first is that it offers a nice escape route from McTaggart’s Paradox.33 This paradox rears
its head for any theory according to which time passes. We can reconstruct the
32
33

See Cameron (2015).
See McTaggart (1908).
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argument as follows:
7. Time passes. (Supposition)
8. So, some event, E, is past. (7)
9. So, E was present. (8)
10. For all Fs, if something was F, then it is F in the past.
11. So, E is present in the past. (9, 10)
12. So, E is both past and present. (8, 11)
13. Nothing can be both past and present.
14. Therefore, it is not the case that time passes. (12, 13)
Recall, on CST, the fact that I was eating at 6pm yesterday is made true not by how
past me is, but rather it is made true now, by my intrinsic age property, n, along with
my temporal distributional property of being, at age n, such that I was eating at 6pm
yesterday... Put simply, Cameron’s account of tensed facts (and their truth-makers)
creates the space to escape.
This is a nice solution to the paradox. Importantly, however, it does not constitute
reason in favor of CST over MGB. Earlier I explicitly characterized MGB without any
commitments to theses about tense. So a parasite strategy is available. Should they
want to, proponents of MGB could adopt Cameron’s solution—that is, deny that if
something was F, then it is F in the past—and thereby acquire a solution to the
paradox.34
34

This is not to say that this addition to MGB would be welcomed with open arms. In fact, I am
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A second reason Cameron offers is that CST is better suited to capture our intuition
that the future is open than the growing block view. Here’s his argument.35 There are
two ways to account for future openness:
I NDETERMINISM : Some future contingent propositions have indeterminate
truth-values.
U NDERDETERMINISM : There is no fact of the matter regarding the truth-value of
some future contingent propositions.
CST fits naturally with I NDETERMINISM while growing block views fit naturally with
U NDERDETERMINISM. I NDETERMINISM does better justice to our openness intuitions
than U NDERDETERMINISM. So much the worse for growing block views.
Cameron offers three good reasons for the superiority of I NDETERMINISM.36 First,
U NDERDETERMINISM (in tandem with the growing block view) is too limited in what it
can allow to be open and fixed. There is “no room for the growing blocker to to say
that some future contingents are fixed.” After all, if there is no future ontology, nothing
speaks to the truths of these future contingents. Second, I NDETERMINISM satisfies
intuitions about retrospective assessement. Past predictions about the present seem
capable of being true. This is difficult to explain on U NDERDETERMINISM, since it seems
the past prediction must be neither true nor false at the time of prediction. Not so for
I NDETERMINISM. Third, I NDETERMINISM coheres better with our attitudes towards
disposed to avoiding this claim, if possible. Regardless of what I endorse later on, the point stands;
Cameron’s solution to McTaggart’s Paradox is compatible with MGB, and so does not constitute a reason
to prefer CST.
35
See Cameron (2015, §5.4-§5.5)
36
See Cameron (2015, pp.197-201).
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future contingents. If we are confident that the future is open, and that this means
there are no facts of the matter regarding future contingents, then we are confident
that ‘it will rain tomorrow’ is neither true nor false. But this means we ought to reject
that claim and its negation. This is a bad result. Openness intuitions do not prescribe
the rejections of some options, but rather that some options not be rejected.
Suppose we concede this. What follows? I say not much, so far as MGB is
concerned. Insofar as this argument is sound, it targets only the standard version of the
growing block view—one that does not deploy Meinongian resources to characterize
the future. This is because standard growing blockers are naturally disposed to
endorsing U NDERDETERMINISM; because given their ontology, it looks as if there is
nothing that speaks to the truth of future contingents. MGB, on the other hand, has a
lot to say about future things; there are indeed entities—non-existent ones—that speak
to the truth of future contingents. For the reasons Cameron suggests, then, MGB fits
more naturally with I NDETERMINISM than U NDERDETERMINISM. So there are
compelling points in favor of CST, but they are not points that MGB cannot also earn.

4.4.2

Skow’s Quasi-Fragmentalism

Brad Skow is partial towards what he calls the anemic view of time’s passage,
according to which temporal passage is akin to spatial variation. Yet, he goes to great
lengths to defend the moving spotlight theory from a number of objections, offering
guidance on what one ought to say if they want a more robust account of passage than

74

he does.37 In doing so, a view that looks like Fragmentalism emerges. Fragmentalism
is the view that reality is not a metaphysically unified place; it is made up of
fragments—maximal coherent collections of facts.38 Fine’s version sees reality as a
series of tensed fragments that do not cohere with one another; the world is
contradictory in the sense that, in reality, there are facts with incompatible content. So
reality disagrees about what is absolutely present; presentness is relative to something.
Though the views look quite different at first, they both land on this principle, hence
‘Quasi-Fragmentalism’. On QF, reality is composed of spacetime points with a structure
described using Minkowski geometry. Ultimately, what this does is relativize tensed
facts to spacetime points.
Why go this way? For one, it captures a robust sort of passage while comporting
nicely with special relativity. I have already bracketed the question of whether MGB (or
any other view) is compatible with the findings of the empirical sciences. For now, I am
happy to grant this as a point in favor of QF. But this point does not go unanswered.
There is a heavy price to pay for “going fragmentalist.” Our intuition that the present is
privileged is more precisely an intuition that the present is absolutely privileged. A view
on which no parts of spacetime are absolutely present, and every part of spacetime is
relatively present, can hardly be said to capture the intuitive sense in which the present
is metaphysically privileged. Insofar as QF is meant to be attractive to a-theorizers, this
is nearly a nonstarter; it is a clear violation of P RIVILEGED P RESENT, which specifies
that there is only one objectively privileged present. Maybe this heavy price is worth
37
38

See Skow (2015, §6-§9).
See Fine (2005).
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paying, but the payoff better be proportionally massive. I am skeptical it will suffice.
For two, QF offers a more robust account of time’s passage than the anemic view.
Time passes because, for any given point, there are past points and future points
relative to it. This is a nice feature but only for the empirical reason we have already
mentioned. The trouble here is simple. This sort of passage QF offers is off-target;
while it is a genuine sort of passage, it is not adequately connected to the intuitive sort
of passage we are aiming to vindicate. Meghan Sullivan puts this point nicely:
If defenders of the Passage Intuition want to save the appearance that the
present is an instant that you, the reader, occupy, MST-Spacetime is no help.
The intuitions about passage we want to recover are not intuitions about
points of space-time, they are intuitions about the macrophysical world.39
To be fair, there is more utility in both CST and QF beyond what I have pointed out
here, and just how compelling the rejoinders I offer on behalf of MGB is open for
debate. We’ve only just started. Although the final score has yet to be determined, I
think it is fair to say that MGB deserves a seat at the table—which is in some cases the
best we can hope for as we continue to develop increasingly serviceable theories.
Minimally, MGB’s prospects call out for further philosophical attention.

39

See Sullivan (2018).
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Introduction to Moral Theory
Ethics and Contemporary Issues
Critical Thinking
Theories of Knowledge and Reality
Philosophy of Religion

Summer 2018, Summer 2019, Summer 2020
Spring 2020
Fall 2019
Fall 2017, Spring 2020
Fall 2019
Fall 2018, Fall 2019
Summer 2016, Summer 2017
Summer 2015

Teaching Assistant
Introduction to Logic (M. Rieppel)
Human Nature (A. Gallois)
Introduction to Logic (M. Rieppel)
Theories of Knowledge and Reality (M. Heller)
Theories of Knowledge and Reality (R. Van Gulick)
Metaphysics & Epistemology (T. Pickavance)
Symbolic Logic (T. Pickavance)
Epistemology II: Religious Pluralism (T. Pickavance)
Philosophy of Religion (T. Pickavance)
P ROFESSIONAL &
D EPARTMENTAL
S ERVICE

Service Positions
Capstone Thesis Advisor, Providence Christian College
Graduate TA Mentor, Philosophy Department, Syracuse University
Founder/Organizer, Minorities and Philosophy: Syracuse University Chapter
Volunteer Philosophy Instructor, Southside Academy Charter School
President, Talbot Philosophical Society, Biola University
Vice-President, Talbot Philosophical Society, Biola University
Communications Chair, Talbot Philosophical Society, Biola University
Conferences/Other Events
Referee, 2020 SU Graduate Conference (Sara Bernstein, Michael Rieppel)
Referee, 2019 SU Graduate Conference (Jennifer Whiting, Luvell Anderson)
Referee, 2018 SU Graduate Conference (Trenton Merricks, Kara Richardson)
Chair, The Question of Ontology Conference (Schaffer, Cumpa, Yablo)
Chair, SPAWN 2017, ‘The Collective Grounds of Relations’ (Raul Saucedo)
Referee, 2017 SU Graduate Conference (Agustı́n Rayo, Fred Beiser)
Assistant Organizer/Chair, 2017 California Metaphysics Conference (USC)
Chair, 2nd IAPDD, ‘What Does it Mean to Kill Someone?’ (A. Omelianchuk)
Referee, 2016 SU Graduate Conference (Daniel Korman, David Sobel)
Co-Organizer, ‘Minorities in the Media’, MAP: Syracuse University
Chair, 2015 APA Pacific Division Meeting, ‘Measure is Puzzling’ (A. Segal)
Referee, 2015 SU Graduate Conference (Douglas Portmore, Kim Frost)
Co-Organizer/Referee, 2014 TPS Spring Conference (Edward Feser)
Co-Organizer/Referee, 2013 TPS Fall Conference (David Hershenov)
Co-Organizer, 2013 New Graduate Student Orientation
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Fall 2016
Spring 2016
Fall 2015
Spring 2015
Fall 2014
Spring 2014
Spring 2014
Fall 2013
Fall 2013

2020–2021
2016–2018
2015–2018
2015–2016
2013–2014
2012–2013
2012
postponed
April 2019
April 2018
February 2018
June 2017
April 2017
January 2017
May 2016
April 2016
March 2016
April 2015
March 2015
March 2014
November 2013
August 2013

Co-Organizer/Referee, 2013 TPS Spring Conference (Keith DeRose)
Co-Organizer/Referee, 2012 TPS Fall Conference (Stephen T. Davis)
Co-Organizer, 2012 New Graduate Student Orientation
R EFERENCES

Kris McDaniel
University of Notre Dame
kmcdani1@nd.edu

Shieva Kleinschmidt
University of Southern California
kleinsch@usc.edu

Mark Heller
Syracuse University
heller@syr.edu

Timothy Pickavance
Biola University
tim.pickavance@biola.edu
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March 2013
November 2012
August 2012

